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
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THE MILITARY DANGER
OF HOME RULE
IN IRELAND

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
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
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**THE MILITARY DANGER
OF HOME RULE
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
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PREFACE

IN venturing to touch on the vexed Irish question, my excuse must be that my family, after many centuries in Scotland, spent two hundred years in Ireland : from the middle of the seventeenth to that of the nineteenth century. They there lived the quiet life of country gentlemen in King's County ; and also of British soldiers throughout the world, at all events from the days of Marlborough's great victories, in which they took part.

In the present revolution under which we suffer, the British constitution has been uprooted, and we are now threatened with the dismemberment of the United Kingdom as well.

I have, therefore, as a soldier, made bold to draw the attention of my fellow countrymen, on whom the momentous decision must rest, to the military dangers, to Britain and to her Empire, and particularly to Ireland, involved in Home Rule ; and have based my views on Irish History, of which I give a short précis ; as the experience of the past—in the traditions of which I was brought up—is the only sure guide to the serious probabilities of the future.

In handling the subject I have had, perforce, to deal, historically, with foreign intervention in its effects on past Irish history; but with no feeling of resentment towards our gallant enemies of the old days. While the struggle lasted, each side fought hard for its own; but, now, the enemies of those days are, all four, our very good friends, and will, we all trust, remain so.

Our friendship with France is not only cordial, but has quite lately stood the stress of two critical periods of acute international tension, that threatened the balance of power in Europe: a balance on which depends the freedom of each unit of the European community of nations, including our own. The people of the United States are of our own race.

T. F.

February 1912.

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1690. James II. sends Sarsfield to occupy Connaught.
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July 12.—St. Ruth killed at Aughrim and Irish defeated.
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paign; captures Cork and Kinsale.
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1777. France acknowledges independence of United States
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1778. Franco-Spanish coalition threatens to invade England.
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1781. De Grasse sent to America and de Suffren to India.
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1782. Legislative independence given to Irish Parliament.
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General Elliot's successful defence of Gibraltar.
1784. Flood ousted Grattan in Irish Parliament.
1789. French Revolution.
1791. Moderate Irish Catholic claims submitted to Government.
United Irishmen started.
1792. The Republican and Catholic committees now sent threatening petitions to the Irish Parliament, which were refused by it.
Edict of Fraternity by French revolutionary Government, and promise of help to all nations wishing to be "free."
1793. Execution of Louis XVI.
The Government of Great Britain forced the Home Rule Parliament to repeal the Arms Act, and to admit Catholics to Grand Juries and to the *Franchise*.
War in la Vendée.
1794. The Irish revolutionary Directory sent an agent to the revolutionary Government of France.
June 1.—Admiral Howe defeats Villaret-Joyeuse.
- 1794-5. France takes Belgium, Holland, left bank of Rhine, and parts of Piedmont and Spain.
1795. Lord Fitzwilliam sent to Ireland; he and Grattan draft a Bill giving full Catholic claims. This was rejected by the Irish Parliament.
Camden succeeded Fitzwilliam. The Catholic convention dissolved, and its members combine with the Northern Republicans. An Irish Directory.
October 1.—French Directory constituted.
Slight collision with rebels at Armagh.
Franco-Spanish Alliance.
- 1796.—Napoleon's campaign in Italy.
Wolfe, Tone, and Lewins sent by Irish Directory to that of France, for an alliance and military assistance.
Lord Edward Fitzgerald and Wolfe Tone saw the French Directory, and arranged for a French invasion of Ireland.
An indemnity Act, an insurrection Act, and an act against assassinations, were passed by Irish Executive.

1796. Lord Edward Fitzgerald and A. O'Connor saw Rein-
hart at Altona, and, later, also saw Hoche, and
arranged details of invasion.
Irish Executive raise 30,000 Yeomanry.
December 20.—French invasion reached Bantry Bay.
1797. January 6.—French had all left Bantry Bay.
February 14.—Victory of St. Vincent.
February 22.—Tate's French convict invasion in
Wales.
March 16.—Napoleon defeats Austrians at Taglia-
mento.
May-June.—Mutinies in British fleets.
Lake disarms Ulster.
October 11.—Victory of Camperdown.
October 17.—Treaty of Campo Formio.
December 17.—Napoleon returns to Paris.
1798. Irish Executive arrests all United Irish Leinster
Committee.
Lord Edward Fitzgerald taken, wounded, and died.
May 3.—Irish insurrection broke out.
May 21.—Defeated at Vinegar Hill.
Continuance of guerilla war.
May 13.—Napoleon sails for Egypt.
The Order of St. John of Malta surrenders the island
to him.
August 2.—Battle of the Nile.
August 22.—Humbert lands at Killala.
September 8.—He surrendered to Lake.
September 16.—Napper Tandy landed on Inishmore
Island.
September 16.—Admiral Bompard with Hardy's 3,000
sailed from France.
Defeated by Admiral Warren towards end of the
month.
October 17.—Treaty of Campo Formio.
October 24.—Small Dutch expedition for Ireland
captured off the Texel.
October 27.—Naval Commander Savary, with rein-
forcements, reached Killala.
1799. May 4.—Capture of Seringapatam, by Lord Harris.
1801. January 1.—Passage of the Act of Union.
1801. Rejection of Catholic Emancipation.

1802. Peace of Amiens.
1803. Napoleon, through British Ambassador, invites Britain to combine with him.
Resumption of war with France.
July 23.—Emmett's Irish Rebellion.
1804. Napoleon becomes Emperor.
1804-5. He contemplates fresh landings in Ireland.
1805. October 21.—Victory of Trafalgar.
1807. British capture Danish fleet.
1809. They capture Russian fleet in Tagus.
1814. Capture of Washington by General Ross.
Napoleon abdicates.
1815. June 18.—Battle of Waterloo.
1829. Catholic Emancipation in Ireland.
1830. Revolution in Paris. Louis XVIII. deposed.
D. O'Connell advocates repeal of the Union.
1843. Agitation for Irish Disunion suppressed.
1845-7. Irish famine.
1848. Free Trade passed by Cobden.
The third French Revolution. Charles X. deposed.
1861-6. Civil War in the United States.
1866. In May.—Fenian invasion of Canada.
1867. June 5.—Fenian attempt to capture Ireland led to rising, easily suppressed.
Fenian outrages in England.
1869. Disestablishment of the Church of Ireland.
1870. Agitation in Ireland for Home Rule, to which Mr. Michael Davitt added the "No rent" agitation.
Mr. Gladstone introduced an Irish Land Bill.
1871. The Communist Revolution in Paris.
1886. Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill.
1893. Gladstone's second Home Rule Bill.
1898. Local self-government in Ireland.



THE MILITARY DANGER OF HOME RULE IN IRELAND

CHAPTER I

THE Irish Question began with the Christian era.

Pagan Ireland received the name of Scotia from the Romans, and invaded Scotland at an early period of the Roman occupation of Great Britain. Later on, the Irish, called Scots, combined with the Picts, or Caledonian Celts, outside the Roman pale in Scotland, and descended on England. They marched to London, and, in the year 368, were completely defeated by Theodosius, whose son was afterwards emperor.

After the Romans left Britain there were raids from Ireland, between 490 and 500, directed against the west of England ; but they left no mark.

Irish Saints¹ invaded Scotland with the Cross in the sixth century, and others, less saintly, with the sword in 563, when they took a firmer place in, and gave the name of Scotland to, that country. It will be seen, therefore, that Great Britain first made the acquaintance of the Irish Question, and of the Irish Celts, as invaders, between the beginning of Christendom and the sixth century.

¹ Saint Columba was born in 521.

Up to the twelfth century they had, in Ireland, only their "Dane" invaders to fight with. The struggle was long and doubtful, but the Danes went down.

The invasion of Henry II. in 1171 with Strongbow's Normans, introduced a stronger element, and one more trained in war and government; but one that added to the strife, owing to the quarrels between the great Norman families that had emerged; and also between them and the Irish; and, in some cases, with the English Crown.

The religious element of strife came, unavoidably, with the Reformation, and its support by Henry VIII., who was excommunicated by the Pope in 1536; a sentence to which the Emperor of Germany had to give effect. Thereupon the Geraldine Earl of Desmond at once negotiated with him and with France, to get an army to come to Ireland, and end the English rule. Henry's statesmanlike view was that *Ireland as a subject, or independent ally of a Continental power, would menace the existence of England.*

This view is confirmed by Desbrière in his history of French landings in Britain, in a letter he quotes, from the French Directory to General Hoche, about the proposed Franco-Dutch invasion of Ireland, and of England at the same time; and dated June 19, 1796. After some grandiloquent language, the practical result to be aimed at is put in words that confirm those of Henry VIII., namely: "*To detach Ireland from England; that is to reduce the latter to the position of being no longer more than a second-rate power, is to deprive her of a great part of her superiority on all the seas.*"

"It will be superfluous to dilate on all the advantages that the independence of Ireland will secure to France," etc. History repeats itself as the centuries go on¹; and, a century later, Captain Mahan of the United States Navy the most weighty of living writers on naval questions, recorded it as his opinion that *England could not concede Home Rule to Ireland without undermining her own strategic position.*

About the same time that the Earl of Desmond was busy on the Continent, an O'Donnell was intriguing with the King of Scotland, with a similar object.

Henry took vigorous action in Ireland, and re-established his authority there; but, isolated as he was, his greatest danger was that of invasion from France. He raised 120,000 men, probably one of the largest armies, in proportion to population, we ever had, while de Lisle had a fleet at Portsmouth; and yet the French occupied the Isle of Wight, and were only forced to leave owing to plague in their ships.

The effect of the Reformation on Europe led for

¹ Cf. Captain Desbrière's most interesting work, "*Projets et tentatifs de débarquement aux îles Britanniques*," in preparing which, under the very happy relations now existing between us and France, both Governments gave him, it is understood, access to information from State records.

This quotation is given in vol. i. 108, and the following is the French text :

"Détacher l'Irlande de l'Angleterre, c'est-à-dire réduire celle-ci à n'être plus qu'une puissance du second ordre, c'est lui enlever une grande partie de sa supériorité sur toutes les mers. Il serait superflu de s'étendre, sur tous, les avantages que procurera à la France l'indépendance de l'Irlande," etc.

several centuries to immense, and, from the Catholic point of view, natural efforts, on the part of Rome and the Catholic powers, to stamp it out. We Protestants, of course, think such efforts unpardonable. As regards the latter powers, the motive forces were rather dynastic and racial, though religion was what appealed to the passions of the masses.

As regards Britain, Cardinal Newman, one of the greatest of the sons of Oxford, has truly pointed out that the Celtic Irish never accepted the Reformation. Nor, for that matter, did the Protestants accept the counter-reformation. That is where the deadlock came in.

The Continental persecution of Protestants began in the thirteenth century, when the Albigenses were destroyed on religious grounds; and French Protestants suffered as early as 1530.

The Holy Catholic League started in 1576, four years after the massacre of St. Bartholomew. The French Henry IV. abjured Protestantism in 1593; while the Edict of Nantes, signed on April 13, 1598, was revoked in 1685.

These were incidents in the great counter-reformation movement, engineered on the Continent, for the complete extirpation, among Protestants, of religious, and, as a means to that end, of civil liberty as well.

The consequence was that great numbers of Huguenot, and other Continental Protestants, came over and settled in Britain, and Catholic Ireland, unhappily, became, with us, the main battleground of the secular attempts against Protestantism, which was, there, often fighting for its life.

The general principle of Protestantism is the right of all men to their own religion, so long as they equally tolerate that of others; and those of that faith have been accused of cruelty and inconsistency in Ireland, for not acting on that principle; but we have to remember that the latter condition, for the reasons already touched on, was not existent there at the time. There was no tolerance on either side, for Continental Europe insisted on a fight to a finish; so there was a welter of cruelty on both that, under similar circumstances, may yet recur in the absence of a United Government in Britain to enforce peace on all alike.

On the accession, in 1556, of Queen Mary, expecting her support as a Roman Catholic, the O'Mores and O'Connors in Offaly and Leix had killed off the English settlers, men, women, and children; levelled their castles, and burnt the country up to Dublin. The Queen approved of Offaly being formed into King's County, so called after her husband, and Leix into Queen's County, after herself; and these she had "settled" with other "Planters."

Elizabeth, against whom a bull of excommunication had been issued, and whose life was constantly threatened by Catholic emissaries of the hostile Continental powers, had, in her own person, a standing proof that papal control of Catholics, in a Protestant state, would lead to divided allegiance.

Accordingly she thought it necessary to establish a Protestant Episcopal Church in Ireland. The Acts of Uniformity and Supremacy were applied there; Catholics were persecuted within the pale, and they naturally appealed to the Papacy and to Spain,

who, however, had no right whatever to interfere in Britain.

In 1562 occurred the massacre of the Protestants at Vasse, in France, by the Duke of Guise. This was followed in Ireland by Shan O'Neil's rebellion in Ulster, in 1565, which was defeated by Sir Henry Sidney, helped by Scottish and Celtic Irish supporters.

In 1569, the Irish in Munster were threatened by Devonshire adventurers.

Trusting to Spain, and led by the Earl of Clan-carty and Fitzmaurice, they rose in rebellion. There was the usual cruelty on both sides. The Irish had offered the Island to Philip, but the Pope refused to let him take it, except as a fief from the See of Rome. Philip declined.¹

While he counted on Mary Queen of Scots becoming Queen, he thought rather to make England Catholic, than to exert himself about Ireland. So the Irish were left in the lurch by him for the moment; for, after the Ridolfi plot, Spain and England drew together for a time.

In 1572 came the massacre of St. Bartholomew, that fanatical orgie of blood, where the Parisians were the willing tools of the counter-reformation, the triumph of which seemed assured; while the Holy Catholic League started with new energy four years later, and gave a fresh stimulus to religious war in Ireland. Other French towns

¹ The Papacy claimed the ownership of Ireland, which it gave to Henry II., on the plea that Constantine had given all the islands to the See of Rome; a gift that would now include Australia, America, Africa, and the United Continents of Europe and Asia. A generous emperor!

followed the lead of Paris. The deed had the full approval of Rome.

In 1577 the Roman see had fitted out an expedition of some seven hundred men for Fitzmaurice, under the command of Stuckley; who took it to fight against the Moors instead. These killed him and destroyed his army.¹

The Pope once more supplied the Roman Catholic Irish with fresh funds to rebel, and in 1579 a small expedition from Spain, under James Fitzmaurice, brother of the Earl of Desmond, landed at Dingle. His troops, at Tralee, murdered two English officers. Upon this the Earl of Desmond, of the family of Fitzgerald, joined him, and a new rising started.

The Queen put Thomas Butler, tenth Earl of Ormond, in command, in January 1580. He swept the country with great severity and destroyed the invaders. Then, in 1579-80, a fresh force of some eight hundred men landed from Spain at Smerwick in Kerry. Admiral Winter, who fought against the Armada eight years later, denied this force the sea; and Grey, Sidney's successor, carried the defences and put the invaders to death. The rising died of inanition, and by 1584 English authority was restored.

These attempts at raising Ireland were, apart from the religious question, probably connected with the coming Armada; but even such feeble landings showed what the Continent could do,

¹ Stuckley had been a privateer; a Protestant at home; a Catholic at Rome; and "*advocatus Hiberniæ*" at Madrid. Gregory XIII., in giving him the command of his "army of Ireland," made him Marquis of Leinster, presumably "*a Marquis in partibus.*"

to disturb Britain, by military intervention in Ireland.

The Edict of Nantes, signed in 1598, did much to calm religious strife in France; but did not affect Spain, and in 1599 came Tyrone's insurrection based on promises of Spanish assistance.

This Tyrone, one of the family of Shan O'Neil, had been made Earl of Tyrone by Elizabeth in 1598; but preferring the headship of his Sept, he obtained arms and ammunition from Spain; and, having become the leader of nearly all of the Celtic chieftains, he carried out a guerilla war with Sir John Norris, the English commander, and afterwards defeated his successor Sir H. Bagnel, with great loss, at Blackwater, where Bagnel was killed.

Elizabeth then sent over Essex in 1599, as Lord Lieutenant, with considerable powers, and with 18,000 men. He failed to secure results; Tyrone amused him with negotiations, and Essex consented to "a cessation of arms." He then went to England and to his end.

Essex was a man of great parts, and of brilliant personal courage, as he showed in leading the successful assault on Cadiz; but he had had no military experience, to fit him for the military task assigned to him in Ireland. His opponent, on the other hand, had long experience of guerilla warfare, and was at home in the country.

In November 1602, 4,000 Spanish and Italian regular troops, part of a larger force from Spain, landed at, and took Kinsale under Don John Daguilla.¹

Lord Mountjoy, successor to Essex, wisely con-

¹ Kinsale was a most important port as early as the reign of Henry VII., suited to the small ships of the day.

centrated in Munster, and invested them. Daguilla, called on to surrender in November, said he "held the town for Christ and Spain." Ireland was not mentioned: Spain clearly aimed at a permanent naval base, and foothold in Ireland, in league with the disloyal Irish. A further substantial reinforcement from Corunna, under Ocampo, managed to land at Castlehaven, and raised the Munster chiefs, who let the invaders occupy their castles and defences. Admiral Levison could do nothing there; while Mountjoy, greatly outnumbered, had to detach largely, but stuck to Kinsale, the decisive point, though he could not prevent O'Donnell,¹ urged by Daguilla, from entering it with very large reinforcements. He still pressed the siege, in spite of greatly reduced effectives; when, in December, O'Neil arrived with another force of 4,000 and joined the invaders.

The Celtic-Spanish armies arranged, at once, to attack the Deputy; but in face of his alertness, they hesitated and began to retreat. Leaving Carew to observe the Spanish in their defences in the town, Mountjoy, at once, attacked the main body, with less than a quarter of their numbers, and completely defeated the Irish and some Spanish trained infantry, which latter fought resolutely in their support.

Unfortunately he had not force enough to storm Kinsale, but the Spaniards, on December 24, 1601-2, surrendered it, and all their other footholds in Ireland, on condition that they were carried home and released there. Tyrone also surrendered unconditionally.

¹ Afterwards made Earl of Tyrconnel on the accession of James I.

CHAPTER II

AFTER the death of Elizabeth in 1603, the crowns of England and Scotland were united in the person of James I.

In 1608 the failure of the rebellion in the north of Ireland led to the further colonisation of Ulster, under the new king.

Falkland, appointed in 1628, failed to mend matters ; while Wentworth, the next Deputy, afterwards Earl of Strafford, and executed in 1640, during the period 1633-6, alienated the Irish, by getting their Parliament to vote money for the King, and afterwards refusing to press for the "Graces" which they claimed, and which they believed he had promised them when they passed the vote ; and further, by threatening Irish tenures in Connaught ; as well as by his intolerant attempt to drive all other Protestants into the Irish Episcopal Church, to which, as it happened, my family belonged, for two centuries, after leaving Scotland.

Wentworth, as the King's man, and distrusting the English Parliament, seems to have thought of treating Ireland somewhat as a Crown Colony.¹

He had increased the royal army from some 3,000 to 12,000 men, with a view to supporting Charles ;

¹ Cf. Morley's "Life of Cromwell," p. 308.

and had advised him to enlist some 4,000 disbanded Spanish Catholic soldiers, available in Flanders.

The English Parliament, however, insisted on the reduction of the Irish army to 3,000 men, and, not unnaturally, refused to support the enlistment of Spanish soldiers in Flanders. It neglected, however, to see that there was reliable force in Ireland, to protect the Protestants and other loyalists there.

Seeing this division of authority in England, the native Irish considered that their opportunity was coming; while the many thousands of discharged soldiers added to the unrest in the country.

It was the shadow of the approaching Civil War in Great Britain that was gradually extending itself over the lesser island.

Then came the massacre of Protestants in 1641.

In the parliamentary disbandment of troops, their arms had been stored in Dublin Castle, and those who aimed at a rising, looked to their capture for distribution to their followers.

There were at the time one Protestant and two Catholic parties in Ireland.

1. The Scottish Presbyterians in the north, with the bulk of the Irish Protestants throughout the country.

2. The Celtic Irish under O'Neil; absolutely opposed to the English connection.

3. The Anglo-Irish under the Lords of the Pale, nearly all Catholics, with Ormond, the twelfth earl, himself a Protestant, at their head.

The Lords of the Pale were loyal to the King, and wished to act constitutionally. Ormond was ordered by him to secure the arms in Dublin: possibly with some idea of reorganising the royal army that

Strafford had built up, and the Parliament had reduced.

The Irish Roman Catholics, whose unbroken devotion to their religion must always be admired, however we condemn their methods, had been cruelly oppressed by penal laws: had many bitter hardships to revenge, and had been under the influence of a continued encouragement from France and elsewhere. They now forced on the fight against the other two parties, rightly believing that the parties in England were too tied by events there, to defend their co-religionists in Ireland. Their plots were well laid and thought out; their plan being to attack all the fortified places at once, Dublin being the main objective, in order to get the arms.

They also published a forged Commission, in the name of Charles I., to arrest all Protestants and take their goods.

One of the two Lords Justices, Sir William Parsons,¹ frustrated the attack on Dublin, and saved the arms; but for this, the Celtic Irish might, for the moment, have mastered the country, and succeeded in what they had been taught to consider their secular aim; namely, the extinction of all Protestants in Ireland.² These latter, unsupported by any Governmental force, and taken by surprise, were, if they failed to reach towns of refuge, massacred, men, women, and children alike, with

¹ A descendant of William, the first of the name, who came to Ireland in Elizabeth's reign, and founded the Parsonstown family.

² An aim that Irish-American Fenians announce to be, as it has been, the secular aim still; while they have taken the place of the European paymasters who formerly subsidised rebellion in Ireland.

a brutal savagery unequalled in the past ; or, after being robbed of their all, and stripped naked, were turned out to face the elements in the open, where great numbers died. There is little doubt that from 100,000 to 200,000 of them succumbed as the result of the rising, which went on for two years. There were many estimates of the Protestant dead. One Commission put their numbers at 300,000 ; while a private estimate, ascribed to a Protestant clergyman, one of a body on whom the sins of others were often foisted, in addition to their own, puts the number at 4,028. The precision of his statement is, at first, attractive ; but, after all, he may have been an ancestor of the American sportsman of a not less uncompromising veracity ; who, having affirmed that his bag of wild duck had been 999, refused all pressure to perjure himself, and to fall back on his imagination, to furnish the "one darned duck" needed to make the bag a round thousand. If we take half the sum of the two figures we shall be safe in putting the number at over 150,000 souls. The effect on Protestant England and Scotland was considerable. It did not die out then, and has not entirely done so since.

Again the protagonists, on both sides in the Civil War, were convinced that France would intervene on the King's side, by occupying Ireland, and invading England from thence.

After the first shock, the Scottish forces, under General Munro, occupied Ulster in 1644, for the protection of the Scottish Protestants there ; and Ormond collected a Royalist army in County Dublin. The Catholic Irish had received the benediction of the Pope on their acts : had assembled a General

Council at Kilkenny, where a papal representative of inferior rank "assisted"; and opened fresh communications with the Catholic powers who were backing them.

Charles, naturally enough, desired to use his Irish army for the struggle in England, and before the end of 1643 arranged a "cessation" of arms, for a year, with the Irish rebels, in order to free that army, to help him in England.

In that year Ormond, raised about this time to a Dukedom, was Lord Lieutenant and Commander-in-Chief in Ireland. The King's forces which he had augmented there, or which had been sent over from Scotland and England for the rising of 1641, must have then reached a strength of some 50,000 men. He detached large numbers of these to England for the King, and, early in the winter, a Catholic Irish regular force, under Lord Byron, landed in Wales, and in January 1644 was defeated at Nantwich by Fairfax. In 1645 the "cessation" turned into a peace with the Irish. In 1647 Ormond, under orders, offered further concessions to the Irish extremists, lay and clerical, now assembled under the Pope's Nuncio at Kilkenny. These conditions, like the secret instructions to Glamorgan, were supposed to have included the offer, if unavoidable, of Catholic supremacy in Ireland; but the Catholic extremists, encouraged by O'Neil's support, and by some military successes, and urged on by the Nuncio, Rinuccini, in the Pope's name¹ would have none of them, and any who accepted the terms were threatened with

¹ The Nuncio advocated a papal Ireland, under the protection of some foreign Catholic king.

excommunication. They pressed on the war; and Ormond, who had been instructed by Charles I., when in the hands of the Scots, that, if overpowered, he should hand over to the English, rather than to the Irish, transferred Dublin, Drogheda, Dundalk, and other garrisons, to Colonel Jones the Parliamentary commander; and then went to England, and, later on, to France with Queen Marie.

The Papal Nuncio had offended the Irish Catholics by his dictation; and after Ormond had gone, leaving Lord Clanricard as his substitute, the latter formed an Irish combination, and expelled the Nuncio; and also asked Ormond to return, which he did.

The Parliamentarians were too much occupied to support Colonel Jones; while Ormond raised a Royalist army of 16,000 men in County Dublin, and all Jones could do was to hold on to Dublin. Drogheda, Dundalk, and other towns were retaken.

As the Civil War progressed, Great Britain, amidst the military incidents of that war, was also torn and distracted by the religious passions that divided the protestant sects; and it was not till after the death of Charles I., in 1649, that Cromwell saw his way to deal with the foreign and religious dangers in Ireland, which were increasingly evident to all who were opposed to foreign intervention: dangers that his genius as a great statesman, and one of the greatest of soldiers, fully recognised. The moment was not opportune, but he saw the urgency.

The Papal Nuncio, it is true, after denouncing the Council of Kilkenny, had left Ireland in despair; but Ormond, the Lord Lieutenant, amidst the welter of factions, held the trump card for the Royalist

cause, while the royal wing of the fleet, under Prince Rupert, was dominant on the Irish coasts. Cromwell, before starting in 1649, sent 4,000 Ironsides to Colonel Jones, who, issuing from Dublin, surprised Ormond outside the city, and completely defeated him, with a loss of 1,000 killed and 2,000 prisoners.

Cromwell then went over, not without many anxieties about sea and land,¹ as Lord Lieutenant, to undertake his masterly campaign, in order to forestall France in Ireland, and to punish the murderous crime of 1641, and undo its work. His purpose was carried out with regrettable severity, that, in these peaceful times, it is easy to bewail; but with cruelty not comparable to the savagery with which unarmed and defenceless Protestants, men, women and children, had been hunted down and done to death, in the effort to exterminate all of their creed. We did not live in those days of struggle for existence, and we may, at least, be thankful that those who attempted the extinction of their fellow Christians, and partly failed, did not all share the fate they had intended for them.

¹ The battle of Worcester, where Cromwell crushed the rising hopes of Charles II., had not been fought and won before September 1651.

CHAPTER III

CHARLES II. had been crowned in Scotland in 1650, and after the Restoration of 1660, under him, and the accession of James II. in 1685, Britain was in the pay of, and under the dominance of Louis XIV. There was of course a natural reaction, but the indirect aim of Charles II., and the direct aim of his brother James, who succeeded him in 1685, was to restore the supremacy of Roman Catholicism, and, at the same time to over-ride parliamentary government.

In Ireland, Charles I. had recognised the claims of the Adventurers, namely those who had latterly acquired lands in Ireland; and Cromwell's Settlement for legalising, and giving a title to such transactions as were recognised, completed in 1652, followed that recognition. Charles II., in 1661, made a fresh Act of Settlement to meet the claims of Roman Catholics and Royalists; but those it was desired to dispossess were too strong to be displaced, and there was no money to effect compensation.

The result was that this last Settlement unsettled more than it settled.

James II. willingly followed the lead of the Earl of Tyrconnel, and, anxious to have as Roman

Catholic Irish army for contingencies, was ready to do away with the Settlement of 1652, even at the cost of English supremacy. It was evident, in 1687, that Tyrconnel was to be the King's General, and was to expel all Protestant officers and men from the Irish army.

In the same year, William of Orange was invited to England, and landed in November 1688. James, fearing this, at one time, under the influence of Tyrconnel, contemplated putting Ireland in the hands of France, which could then have used it as a base for his support ; but the expectation of an heir, to stand in Mary's way, relieved his fears. He was now advised to bring over Tyrconnel's army, and brought over, among other troops, a great number of individuals whom he put into the English units, which were very indignant with him, and refused to be influenced by them.

William selected Schomberg as second in command. Schomberg, born in the Palatinate, had become a Marshal of France, and was, afterwards, expelled for his Protestantism.

In 1689, Tyrconnel, having "Romanised" the Government and the Bench, turned all the machinery of the law against the Irish Protestants. He tampered with the Act of Settlement of Charles II., and he also dismissed 6,000 Protestant veteran soldiers from the army, and replaced them by Roman Catholics. These lived on, and harassed the Protestants, whom he disarmed later on, and who were driven from their homes, while many fled the country ; but Enniskillen and Londonderry were garrisoned by them. Tyrconnel pretended to be helping James, while he co-operated with Louis,

whom he took partly into his confidence; though he probably cajoled the French king into thinking that his old proposal, to transfer Ireland to him, was still his intention. His real aim was to expel the English, and to seize the country for himself; an aim that has occurred to others since.

He sent Mountjoy on a sham mission to the Court of James at St. Germain's, and he was thrown into the Bastille. Then he got together, and armed, some 50,000 Celtic Catholics, in addition to very large numbers who armed themselves for plunder alone. Protestant property, valued at from £4,000,000 to £6,000,000, was recklessly destroyed, to their loss and that of the country, and the English and other Protestants were, as in 1641, driven into shelter, in this case at Londonderry and other northern posts; or forced to take refuge in England and Scotland. The French invaders, all regulars, landed at Kinsale in March 1690, about 8,000 strong. Louis got some 4,000 Irish in exchange, to make soldiers of them.¹ The Catholics now held almost all Ireland.

Having matured his plans, Tyrconnel seems to have thought he might use the unfortunate King as a pawn in his game, and arranged with Louis to get him to cross over. He came, escorted by thirty French sail of the line and seven frigates, for France was, at that time, stronger at sea than we were; and accompanied by Count d'Aveau, a very experienced diplomatic agent of Louis. d'Aveau brought 100,000 crowns, to buy any English Parliamentary malcon-

¹ Viscount Mountcashel (Justin Maccarthy) wounded and captured when Colonel Wolseley defeated him at Newtown Butler, was allowed on parole to France, and, it seems, broke it to command this Irish contingent.

tents he could get at. There came also with him some 400 French officers, and large supplies of arms and warlike stores. King James landed at Kinsale, advanced thence to Cork, and went on to Dublin, where he found only a few loyal English Catholic Jacobites, who desired his restoration, and the English connection, Tyrconnel having carried nearly all the Catholic Irish for separation.¹ He then went up to Londonderry, and left the French General Maumont in charge of the investment. About that time Admiral Count de Chateaurenard,² with a French fleet, was making himself quite at home in Bantry Bay, unloading munitions of war and money for his countrymen, and their allies. Admiral Arthur Herbert,² with an English squadron sent to interrupt French communications with Brittany, entered the Bay with a weaker force. He had about nineteen ships of the line to the Frenchman's twenty-four, but his inferiority in guns was apparently less. It was a cramping position for the British attack, which does not seem to have been vigorous, and which was so severely handled by the skill of de Chateaurenard, that Herbert had rather a narrow escape, and thought it prudent to haul off, and stand out to sea, for help.

His rendezvous was the Scilly Islands, but he considered it necessary to run straight for Portsmouth and refit. A similar thought seems to have struck de Chateaurenard, who made off to Brest.

¹ Tyrconnel, it is said, accompanied the writs he issued for the election of Parliament, with his personal instructions as to who were to be elected; and later dictators have, in Ireland, taken a leaf out of his book to help the judgment of the "People" when in doubt.

² Macaulay's History of England, i., 754.

After such extraordinary good fortune, no wonder the French returned to the Bay at the end of the following century, for their next invasion, with a relatively light heart, that events justified as regards immunity.

Admiral Herbert had commanded the fleet that brought William III. to England, and, after Bantry Bay, the King created him Earl of Torrington; perhaps "*pour encourager les autres*," as Voltaire remarked in another connection. The Earl left no heir; and Admiral of the Fleet Sir George Byng was created the first Viscount Torrington in 1721.

King James returned to Dublin, and gave countenance to the assembly of a Parliament of Tyrconnel's Catholic followers, which, however, he was powerless to control in its reckless disregard for his cause. They repealed the Act of Settlement of Charles II., passed an Act of Attainder covering some thousands: those who did not surrender were liable to execution without trial. They also issued false coinage,¹ and forced its acceptance at fixed prices by law. These acts were aimed at the Protestants, and at the loyal Roman Catholics. This, and the threat of the invasion of England, ended any chance for James, as, indeed, he saw himself.

Meantime, the English Parliament had, in August 1689, sent over Schomberg, whose troops were quite untrained, and unfit to shoot or to fight, and also miserably provided by the venal agents appointed by Parliament; which, long reduced to impotence by party faction, could not put matters

¹ Louis kindly contributed a damaged brass gun as material for some of this coinage. It was called Gun Money.

right. For this reason, and owing also to the continued rains, the force, though not engaged, soon suffered from pestilence, and half of it died.

There were, with Schomberg, some thoroughly trustworthy regiments of Huguenot French refugees; but certain French Catholic, and sham Protestant spies, the latter deserters from the Low Countries, got into their quarters, as a base for their corruption, and with a view to driving Schomberg to fight at a disadvantage, while they gave treacherous aid to the enemy. They had opened correspondence with d'Aveau. Schomberg intercepted it; hanged six ringleaders and sent two hundred as prisoners to England in chains. He showed great skill, and never lost a flag or a gun, though at one moment he had to face 20,000 troops, and multitudes of armed plunderers as well, with some 9,000 convalescents; while many of his officers were raw and untrained.

In the absence of any efficient land force, in the face of immense numbers, and with the Navy divided against itself, the outlook was black indeed for the Protestant side; and France was, further, getting ready for an invasion of England.

It was about this time that James, in view of Schomberg's difficulties, felt able to detach Sarsfield, with five regular regiments, to the west. He drove the English detachments out of Sligo, took Galway, and controlled Connaught.

Early in 1690, William, with great difficulty, prepared for war; collected 30,000 well-armed, and well-provided troops—two-thirds of them from Great Britain—while six war ships were detailed to

receive him and escort him to Ireland with some 280 transports.

A conspiracy for a Jacobite rising, in his absence, was prepared and frustrated, and he finally landed at Carrickfergus.

The identity of the crisis as to Ireland, which Cromwell and William faced, in turn, is very remarkable. Both were experienced statesmen, and both, as soldiers, had, as few soldiers ever had, the inestimable qualities of instant and correct decision, and of unbending resolution as well. Each in his turn decided that Ireland was the decisive point, and each went, undeterred by the great dangers they left behind. Weaker men might have played for safety; they played for victory, and won.

On June 30, one day before the battle of the Boyne on July 1, 1790, Tourville, with a French fleet, appeared off the Needles for the invasion of England.

The Queen in Council sent specific orders to fight, to Torrington, who had lately been at Bantry Bay, and who now commanded the Anglo-Dutch fleets. Like Russell, later on, he might have put "country before all"; but he only obeyed the letter, not the spirit of the order, and let the gallant Dutch engage, but failed to support them with all his heart. He was defeated with serious loss, and had to run for the shelter of the intricacies of the Thames, where he took up the buoys to prevent pursuit.¹ So

¹ Torrington appears to have been confined in the Tower, perhaps the only place where he was safe from the fury of his countrymen. He was tried by court-martial, and "honourably acquitted," but was never employed again.

Tourville won the battle of Beachy Head, but, likewise half-hearted, confined himself to the capture and burning of Teignmouth. There was nothing to stop his expeditionary force on land.

The news of the Boyne victory was soon known, and cheered the English after the defeat at Beachy Head. In the former battle, the French General Lauzun commanded for James, and the disciplined French infantry, in their intrenched position, facing the fords opposite old Bridge, offered a firm resistance to the attack, till they moved to their right to cover the retreat of the Irish, whose small body of mounted men, well trained by Sarsfield, and led by Richard Hamilton, also maintained an unequal fight all day with skill and courage, till defeated. Their infantry offered no resistance whatever: from no lack of native courage, but from the absence of discipline and leadership, as well as from the practice of plunder which ensured their impotence.

In this battle the Irish and their allies wore white badges for the Bourbon king. Those of William wore green sprigs and branches. William, with the onus of the attack, had some 36,000 men. James had 30,000, of whom 10,000 were French regulars.

William was grazed, and somewhat hurt, by a French cannon shot while reconnoitring the evening before the battle, and Schomberg was killed in the action.

During the fight the Stuart and Bourbon standards flew together at Drogheda close by.

Shortly after the battle of the Boyne James returned to Waterford and Kinsale, and sailed thence to France.

In the fighting that followed, Sarsfield, trained in

a good school on the Continent, showed soldier-like ability and tenacity. The defence of Limerick, after Lauzun had withdrawn his French troops, was very creditable to him; and the Irish in the town, who, for lack of discipline and training, were unfit for field fighting, showed their accustomed and enthusiastic courage.

Patrick Sarsfield¹ was of English parentage, and descended from a family that came to Ireland in the reign of Henry II. The family fought on the side of Edward I. and Edward III. against the Scottish forces under Wallace and others. Sir William Sarsfield, Knight, was Mayor of Dublin in 1566. His great grandson Patrick of Lucan, near Dublin, had been deprived of his estates by Cromwell, and reinstated by Charles II. He married Anna, a Celtic lady of the distinguished family of O'More, and the General was the second son of the marriage. His elder brother, William, married Mary daughter of Charles II. and Lucy Walters; and, on his death, Patrick succeeded to the valuable Lucan estates. He had been trained in a French military college, had seen fighting beside Monmouth on the Continent, and he was rapidly and deservedly promoted by James II. At Sedgemoor, opposed to Monmouth, he charged Monmouth's half-defeated infantry; but the Somersetshire men, with their scythes alone, and stiffened by their Militia training, defeated his cavalry and nearly killed him. James gave him command of his Irish army in the Civil War in England, and he was held up at Warminster by a detachment of MacKay's regiment.

¹ Cf. Burke's "General Armory"; and "National Biography," vol. i., p. 305.

In Ireland he more than justified the preference of King James ; and his capture of Ginkell's siege train by a night attack with 500 cavalry, beautifully carried out, showed his 'sound cavalry instincts. This, with the exception of the stand at Limerick, was the one bright incident on his side ; but, apart from his qualities, his countrymen believed in him, as a descendant of the Catholic O'Mores. What made him a power in Ireland was that he understood his countrymen, and how to inspire them to action ; and he behaved as well as he could to his opponents. He was pre-eminently a gentleman ; was M.P. for County Dublin in Tyrconnel's Catholic Parliament, and also an Irish Privy Councillor.

After the first assault on Limerick, Tyrconnel, who had gone to France with Lauzun and the French, came back with St. Ruth, a distinguished French general, who pronounced Athlone to be impregnable ; Ginkell, however, though St. Ruth, with a large Irish army, was behind the town, took it on June 30, 1691 ; his troops showing extraordinary and desperate heroism in the assault ; which immediately followed a repulse.

St. Ruth then elected to fight a pitched battle on the defensive, as he knew the Irish had not the training or discipline for operating in the open. This occurred on July 12, 1691 ; in a position, owing to local obstacles, of, apparently, extraordinary strength. It took place at the village of Aughrim, beside a low hill some 100 feet above the plain, called the Hill of Kilcommedan, and about 1,200 yards from, and nearly due south of the church in the town of Ballinasloe.

The battle-field is nearly 46 miles N.N.E. of Limerick. Its front had a length from north to south of about two miles. It faced east, in the direction of attack, and was in a great measure protected by impassable morasses at its foot, which also extended westward round the left flank at Aughrim. Its right flank rested on the pass of Urrachee.

The obstacle had the effect of securing Ginkell from a frontal counter-attack, and, while the centre was observed and the flanks threatened, a turning movement, which he adopted, was the proper course.

When the English and Huguenot cavalry, under Mackay, after long delay, succeeded in turning the obstacles and falling on the flank of the Irish, they, without the cement of discipline, gave way, were totally defeated, and lost many thousands killed in the retreat.

St. Ruth's dispositions were decidedly good,¹ and with regular troops, even in smaller numbers, they should have been successful. He was killed before the final collapse, and Sarsfield was in no way to blame, as he was told not to move the reserves he commanded, till he got orders, and got none; but, even had he commanded, it is not likely he would have succeeded.

At the beginning of the war, the Navy mustered 173 ships and 42,000 men.

James, as Duke of York and as King, had seen much of, and had done much for, the Navy, which recognised its debt to him, and, to a great extent, adhered with special loyalty to his cause. Indeed, some associated with the Navy seem to have gone

¹ St. Ruth had been employed in the "Dragonades" in France; which did not endear him to the Huguenot cavalry.

to the length of setting English and Dutch sailors at variance, and of influencing certain officers to carry British ships to France and Ireland. The national utility of the Navy was, in consequence, in great measure, neutralised for both sides, to the great gain of our enemies abroad.

While Limerick still held out, Marlborough, with William's approval, and with 5,000 to 6,000 men, planned and carried out a five weeks' campaign in the south of Ireland. The plan, essential, owing to our loss of the command of the sea after the battle of Beachy Head, had opponents in Parliament, in sympathy with the Franco-Celtic coalition, which, though Dublin and Waterford had fallen to William, still held all the southern ports of Ireland from Cork to Bantry Bay, as well as those of Galway and Limerick.

There were, at the time, only 12,000 regular troops in England, and William had actually to send some back from Ireland, under the threat of invasion in the former, while some few units were brought back from the Continent. These enabled Marlborough to sail, after considerable delay, with eight foot regiments and two Marine battalions from Portsmouth, on September 17, under the escort of such English and Dutch ships as had been refitted. The rumour of his sailing had reached Ireland, and the threat of it frightened Lauzun into withdrawing his troops to France.

In the attack on Cork, the Navy gave Marlborough the most hearty support,¹ though contrary winds

¹ Field Marshal Lord Wolseley in vol. ii., pp. 129-221 of his "Life of Marlborough," has treated the subject so forcibly, that there is nothing more to be said. His account is well worth a reference, and is very illuminating. See also the Plans of Cork and Kinsale.

denied him its help at Kinsale. He stormed the outworks of Cork, and forced its speedy surrender. He then, strenuously, besieged the main outwork at Kinsale, which led to the surrender of its garrison of some 5,000 men, but, as with Schomberg's first army, and with the besiegers of Limerick, Marlborough's troops, which had been embarked for weeks before starting, were threatened with pestilence, and he had to withdraw his main body while holding the captured town and its defences.

William had been compelled to return to England for a time, and left Ginkell to carry on the war.

After the defeat at Aughrim, and Marlborough's campaign, Sarsfield had little hope he could hold out at Limerick much longer, and Ginkell, threatened with pestilence, had his own difficulties. Limerick asked for a parley, and Sarsfield claimed, at first, that there should be perfect freedom of religious worship for his people, and that the Roman Catholics should be competent to hold any political or military offices, and have all municipal privileges.

Even had the Irish cause been locally triumphant, those terms, very reasonable under the Union, would have led, at once, to civil war in Ireland; and the Government of Great Britain, in view of national feeling, and with Tyrconnel's fresh object-lesson of the workings of a Roman Catholic Parliament in relation to Protestants, could not have acceded to them. There was a good deal of bluff on both sides, but, for a defeated cause, surrendering its last foothold, the claim was asking for "the rewards of victory as the consolation for defeat," and Ginkell rightly refused to consider such terms. The capitulation took place on October 3.

In the Civil Treaty, however, it was ultimately agreed that the Catholics should "enjoy such privileges, in the exercise of their religion, as were consistent with the law; or such as they had enjoyed under Charles II." This condition applied to all in Ireland, and was, it appears, most wrongly departed from, seven years later, by an Irish Parliament, to its own discredit, and to that of Great Britain.

The terms of the Convention dealing with the surrender of the garrison were, under the circumstances, liberal, indeed generous. It was agreed that all those included in the capitulation should be undisturbed in the possession of their property or estates; or, if they preferred, they would be sent to France under their own generals, at the expense of Government. William's three Lords Justices accepted both arrangements, subject to ratification by the Parliament of Great Britain. Sarsfield, at the end, had 14,000 infantry alone, in Limerick, in addition to other arms, which at one time made a total of 20,000 men; a force so large that it is difficult to see how Ginkell at once besieged and retained it, until a small English squadron of light vessels got up the Shannon, and closed that exit to the garrison. Those who wished were allowed to go to France in transports with Sarsfield, who told them they would return victorious next year; when, as will be seen further on, he was detailed to command them in the great scheme for the invasion in 1692. Some 11,000 men promised to go, but it is doubtful if half that number actually left. The Celtic troops from Ulster refused to go with him, and returned home under the Convention.

Thus the great aims of Tyrconnel were ended, at the cost of much blood and suffering to all the people of Ireland, and to the imminent danger of Britain as a whole.

The last episode was in 1692. William went to war abroad; and, under the temptation to separate England from the "Coalition," and after the death of his sagacious war minister, Louis, unwillingly, yielded to James's suggestion of another invasion of Great Britain.

An army, as in 55 B.C., in 1066, in 1689, and later in 1804, was now secretly assembled on the Norman coast, and 80 French ships of the line were detailed, of which 44 were with Tourville at Brest and the rest at Toulon.

William had 90 ships in the Channel under Russell. Tourville, with 44 sail, appeared, counting that Russell would not fight.

Mary wrote a very dignified and inspiring letter, through Russell, to the fleet. His patriotism was fired, and the Queen and he both deserved the fortunate victory of La Hogue in May 1692.

Tourville, who was numerically quite over-matched, seems to have fought with great skill and gallantry to the end. James II. was a spectator of the defeat.

Sarsfield had been detailed to command the Irish contingents of the expeditionary force.



CHAPTER IV

AFTER 1692 Ireland had, with one exception, peace from actual foreign intervention for about a century; but Guillon, in his work "*La France et l'Irlande pendant la Révolution*," refers to numerous French projects of invasion between 1710 and 1793.¹

In 1759, Thurot, blockaded in Dunkirque, got out on October 15, with a small squadron; sailing to Bergen and the Faroe Islands he, afterwards, found himself, on February 21, 1760, off Carrickfergus. Landing with some 750 men, he took, from its 200 defenders of the 62nd regiment, a castle, where French prisoners were confined. These he released, and being short of supplies, he requisitioned them from Belfast and Carrickfergus, which had no means of defence. Trying to return by the Irish Channel, his ships were destroyed, abreast of the Isle of Man, by Commodore Elliot's ships, and he was killed.

Other projects for the invasion of Ireland were considered in 1666, in 1759, 1769, 1780, and 1793.

That of 1666, in the reign of Charles II., was due to an appeal to the King of France, from the Roman Catholic bishop of Armagh, and some gentlemen revolutionists, for assistance.

They stated there were only 6,000 of the English

¹ Cf. Guillon, pp. 53, 54, 55, 65, 71, 72, and 73.

garrison in Ireland; and promised that the Catholics in three quarters of Ireland would rise if he would furnish 8,000 men. The matter was seriously discussed, and Colbert was put into communication with "le sieur de" Rilly; but owing to the peace of 1667, made by England with France and Holland, the project was abandoned. The objective was to have been Connaught.

In the project of 1769 Grenore was to have been the landing-place and Dublin the objective.

In the beginning of the eighteenth century, Britain, under Marlborough's brilliant leadership, established her military reputation in the Continent of Europe. During the first half, France and Spain confined their actual invasions to Scotland. In the third quarter Britain had great successes on land and sea, chiefly owing to the predominance of the Earl of Chatham, who saw to it that the country prepared for war before embarking on it.

The Irish, later on, noticing the military embarrassment of Great Britain, owing to the colonial war; and seeing the trading concessions she had, under pressure, made to America; very naturally, and with good excuse in the question of trade, used "England's difficulty" to press for like concessions for themselves.

Ireland had been denuded of troops for the American War, and the Irish executive could not, in consequence, prevent a general arming of large numbers of "Volunteers," who honestly, perhaps, fearing foreign intervention, or under the pretext that a French attack on Belfast was likely, while protesting loyalty, aimed at either supporting or coercing their Parliament of 1779 to go on increasing

its demands, while Great Britain was embarrassed abroad.

With these behind them, the Dublin units stood under arms before the doors of the Parliament House, and Grattan carried, in the first instance, an amendment in favour of Irish freedom of trade, for which Lord North, in 1780, passed the necessary legislation. This concession was at once followed up by Grattan, against Lord Charlemont's advice, in order to secure complete legislative independence of Great Britain, for the Government of himself and his friends, by getting the reversal of the Statute called Poyning's Law, by which all Bills of the Irish Parliament, except Money Bills, were subject to the approval of the English Privy Council, and of the Statute 6 of George I., which confirmed the right of the English Government to legislate for Ireland.

The real object of the Irish Volunteers, now completely organised by *their* appointment of Lord Charlemont, a sound and capable statesman, as their Commander-in-Chief, was shown by their holding a convention of their military delegates at Dungannon, with the object of giving the weight of armed force to Grattan's claims. These, backed by the Catholics as well, whose hopes Grattan had, for the moment, encouraged, were submissively granted under Lord Rockingham's Administration, through a motion carried by Fox and Shellburne in 1782; with the full knowledge that, in setting up legislative dis-union, they were establishing an unworkable, and unstable, dual control, by creating a Sectional Home Rule Government.

This was composed chiefly of the party of Protestant Church ascendancy. To this party my

family were attached by personal relationships and friendships, and by a general identity of views and interests.

The individuals in Parliament were among the best, the most loyal, and responsible elements of stability in the country; and they possessed the wealth, the territorial influence, the military resources, and the armed force which, with their forcible qualities of race, enabled them to weather the storm of 1798, almost unaided, owing to the imminence of invasion in Great Britain, till after the crisis was over. Among them too there was a *torrens dicendi copia*, that tomb of action which so often tempts men to futility.

It was not to be expected of them that they should have had the intention of admitting Roman Catholics or Dissenters to power. This disappointed the former, and alienated many of the latter, while they held out no hope for the Irish peasant.

As regards the first two, the majority of thinking men must, even then, have desired the complete religious equality of the Protestant dissenters and of the Catholics, as long as the latter could be counted on to abandon separation and foreign aid, and to keep the religious peace; but the lessons of 1641 and 1689 could not be ignored, and the Protestants of Grattan's Parliament are not to be blamed for believing that the political equality of the Catholic two-thirds would end in another Sectional Home Rule Government—of, it is true the majority—under which they would have been a powerless and, after a time, a defenceless minority; standing to lose their property, their religious freedom, and in some cases their lives. Such will undoubtedly be the

case if a Nationalist-Fenian ascendancy should, as is threatened, be set up in Ireland.

The respect for law and order in Great Britain, though deplorably diminished in the last few years, makes men forget that while the Anglo-Saxon-Norman race is cemented together by the attraction of cohesion, those in Ireland, for at all events seven centuries, have been distracted by the repulsions of race and religion, which have driven them apart by a sort of centrifugal force, that, even under the Union, though gradually becoming less, remains a force to be seriously reckoned with, dormant though it be in quiet times, but still endemic.

Grattan's Parliament, in the spirit of that gratitude which is sometimes displayed by those who have coerced others to let them have their own way, generously, and in good faith, voted for the addition of 20,000 Irishmen to the Navy ; this had unexpected results, as influencing France in her estimate of the injury to British naval power, that the separation of Ireland from Great Britain would effect. The Parliament also persuaded Henry Grattan to accept £50,000 for himself.

No one can doubt his patriotism within the range of his political horizon ; but, in pressing for complete religious and political emancipation, he dreamt that his wonderful and polished eloquence would drown the animosities of centuries ; and that the Catholic Nationalist majority would follow, instead of leading him, till they secured the ascendancy at which they aimed.

Meantime, owing to the development of the American War of Independence, which began in

1775, we were, almost from the beginning, opposed, in North America, to France and Spain, as well as to the forces of our own race.

The armies of Louis XVI. were there fighting alongside those of the Colonists, with the object of weakening Britain, as in 1690; and his Navy, under de Grasse, was often in greater local strength than our own. In 1779-80 the Colonists added their influence to that of France and Spain, in order to negotiate with the Dutch to join the Coalition against us; which they did in the latter year.

In 1781, when the Triple Alliance opposed to us was in full swing, the French sent out a great fleet to America, under de Grasse, which deprived us of the command of the sea off the North American coast, and neutralised Admiral Hood's fleet in the West Indies. Thus the sea ceased to be a secure base there for our operations; and the Colonies, so backed up, were able, successfully, to obtain separation in the end. With the wisdom that succeeds the event, it seems deplorable that a separation, probably, in the long run, inevitable, should have laid the seeds of so much bitterness within the common race, and should have given our foreign enemies such a vantage ground against us.

At the same time the Bailli de Suffren was sent out with a fresh reinforcement of ships to the Indian Ocean, where, for long, he successfully disputed with us the command of that sea, and delayed our assumption of the mastery in India.

It was not surprising, therefore, that, when we

¹ After the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, the French ordered de Grasse to combine with Spain, to take our West Indian Islands. Such was our naval position there.

had to relax the struggle, and concur in the independence of the United States, the French thought Great Britain was at the end of its resources, and assumed a dictatorial attitude in consequence, which had its effect in Ireland, in shaking confidence in her strength.

This was before Rodney's defeat of de Grasse in the West Indies, and Elliot's successful defence of Gibraltar, both in 1782, which disillusioned the French.

To return to Irish affairs.

In 1784, Flood, somewhat of a demagogue, in a measure displaced Grattan in the Irish Parliament, and introduced a Bill for its drastic reform. The House threw it out, and Napper Tandy, in intrigue with France, saw an opening for the agitation that culminated in 1798.

The same year Pitt, at Westminster, tried to introduce a Bill for effective commercial equality between the two countries. Fox and his followers vigorously opposed it, and arranged for an agitation in the Home Rule Parliament, an object-lesson of the disadvantage of a dual control. In face of this opposition, the Bill was so mutilated that the Dublin Parliament had some slight excuse for rejecting it. Pitt, from that time, seems to have looked to Union as the only course.

The revolution of 1789 was thought, at first, in Great Britain to be only a constitutional change, such as had occurred with us. Some revolutionary societies were formed, a few of which sent to congratulate the French Republic on the massacres of September ; but this gradually changed as its true character showed itself, particularly after the

execution of Louis XVI. and the bloodshed that followed in 1793. Though, until they had the responsibility of facing its results, some of the Whigs, among them Fox and Sheridan, were strongly in sympathy with it.

In Ireland, where many Nonconformists felt their disabilities, and particularly those whose religious creed had first flourished under a republic, it had many warm sympathisers, some of them sincere, among the educated, the reckless, and the disappointed, especially in Dublin and Belfast.

Theobald Wolfe Tone was the leading spirit among those who were ready to join France in revolution, in order to destroy the English connection, and set up an Irish republic.

There was also the great body of Catholics, of widely differing views, who, after Grattan's Home Rule Parliament was set up, had formed a central committee in Dublin to help their cause, which seemed permanently blocked ; a fact that was largely responsible for the rising in 1798.

Tone, with no religious convictions to hinder him, conceived the idea of uniting the Jacobins of the north with the Catholics throughout Ireland.

The Government of Great Britain desired to meet the reasonable Catholic claims, and in 1791 the moderate section of the Catholic Central Committee submitted those that might have been obtained, but the bulk of the Committee, set on violence, as in 1641, refused to recognise their action ; drove them out, and joined Wolfe Tone's Revolutionary Association. Each section meant to use the other for its own ends, and if the rebellion had been successful, the Jacobins would have been swamped.

It was an unholy alliance for the sincerely pious Catholics of Ireland, to combine with the Revolution of 1789, which had dealt a blow to their faith from which it has never recovered, and had done much to undermine the foundations of all the creeds of Christendom: a result that I am old-fashioned enough to look upon as a misfortune to humanity; and yet they were ready to fish in any waters, even in the broad and blood-stained torrent of the Great Revolution. It shows that the political side of Roman Catholicism was once more in the ascendant, and that their priesthood, except in the extreme south-west, were powerless to restrain them, as they no doubt desired to do.

It may be worth referring to the organisation of the secret society of the United Irishmen. It, of course, followed the French revolutionary plans, which the Commune of 1871 also, in substance, adopted. It consisted of:

1. Groups of ten to eighteen members who nominated a Non-commissioned officer.
2. Baronial Committees.
3. District Committees.
4. Provisional Directories.
5. The great Executive Directory of Five; voted for by the Provincial Directories, and known by name only to their Secretaries, who counted the votes.

The military organisation had the same basis, all non-commissioned and other officers being elected according to grade, by the Hierarchy of Committees. The Generals were elected by the Executive Directory of Five.

The political value of the organisation was re-

latively effective. The military organisation was a paper one. The elected officers were quite untrained, incapable of teaching or exercising discipline, and of training or leading the men, who were useless as soldiers and without cohesion. The spirit of the *Levée en Masse* was not in it, and energy effervesced in the froth of talk.

The Irish Executive urged that of England to support the English in Ireland, as it was going to be a contest between them and the Nationalists. Their warnings were ignored.

Thinking that Pitt would support them, the Republicans and Catholic Committee, in 1792, submitted petitions couched in strong language; these were rejected by the Home Rule Parliament, which, with difficulty, was induced to pass some slight concessions. These latter encouraged, but did not satisfy the applicants.

In the same year the Roman Catholics assembled a general convention in Dublin, and, passing by Grattan's Parliament, sent a petition to that of Great Britain, whence it should, to be consistent, have been referred back to the Irish Parliament. Tone, and Napper Tandy, the Dublin leader, now tried, in imitation of the French Revolutionists, to raise an army of "National Guards" as a military basis for their aims. This was at once stopped by a proclamation of the Lords Justices against armed assemblies.

In 1793, the Government in England, overriding, at once, the Irish Executive and the Independent Home Rule Parliament, forced the latter to pass a fresh Catholic Relief Bill, repealing the Arms Act, and admitting Roman Catholics to Grand

Juries and to the Franchise, in a way that excluded Catholic gentlemen from the influence they were entitled to, and which it was desirable they should exercise.

The united Catholic and Republican coalition continued to agitate for reform. The "Defenders" were once more in evidence, and murderous intimidation and robberies were employed against the Protestants. A Convention Bill was passed to prevent unlawful assemblies, and then the revolutionaries could do little. Wolfe Tone thought of seceding, and even approached the Chief Secretary with a view to employment.

In 1794 the Irish Directory sent an agent named Jackson to approach the revolutionaries in France. These had just annexed Holland, which they pledged to furnish with thirty ships of the line, a success which, further, encouraged them to weaken their last naval enemy. Jackson's reports to the French Directory show a considerable grasp of the military features and resources of Ireland. In consequence of his visit, the French Directory, in their turn, sent an emissary to see what could be done in England. He proved useless.

In the same year, in view of the national danger, and the consequent need for showing an undivided front, the Whigs joined the Cabinet. Their chief, the Duke of Portland, had been Prime Minister when legislative independence had been granted to the Irish Parliament, and all parties there expected a change of policy, the more so as Lord Fitzwilliam was sent as Viceroy, with Pitt's consent.

In 1795 Fitzwilliam and Grattan drafted a Bill for the immediate granting of the full Catholic claims.

The King appears then to have intervened, and Camden succeeded Fitzwilliam. He had a riotous reception, and the murder of Fitzgibbon in the streets of Dublin was with difficulty prevented.

Grattan, later in 1795, insisted on bringing in the Bill he had prepared with Lord Fitzwilliam, which was finally thrown out by a great majority in the Irish Home Rule Parliament.

The Catholic Convention was now dissolved, and with the exception of a small body of loyal Catholic gentlemen, nearly the whole of Catholic Ireland combined with the Republicans of the north in their design of "severing the last link." Lord Edward Fitzgerald¹ afterwards Commander-in-Chief, Mr. Arthur O'Connor, and the Honourable Valentine Browne Lawless² joined the United Irishmen.

In the first days of January 1796, the Irish Directory dispatched Wolfe Tone and Lewins to that of France, to negotiate an offensive and defensive alliance against the British Government.³ They afterwards appear to have interviewed Hoche at Coblenz.

Later in January Lord Edward went to France, where he met Wolfe Tone, who had previously arrived *viâ* America, accredited from there by the French Consul in Philadelphia. The two, in February 1796, had a conference with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hoche and Carnot being present. They arranged with the Republic to send a French army in support of the insurrection they were

¹ Brother of the Duke of Leinster.

² Afterwards Lord Cloncurry, whose personal recollections may be referred to. He left the party before the end.

³ Cf. Desbrière, vol. i., pp. 92, 93, and 253.

preparing in Ireland. The French offered 25,000 men. The Irishmen said 15,000 would be enough ; and the French engaged to enter into no treaty that did not include the absolute independence of Ireland. An engagement speedily broken.

At home the Catholic "Defenders" exasperated the Northern Protestants of all sorts by constant outrages made to get arms, and so drove them to throw in their lot with the Executive Government. The Orangemen also reorganised their lodges. It was once more a war of religion and race, and at the end of September 1795 a slight brush took place by Armagh between the Nationalist Irish, who looked to a revolutionary republic, and the Protestants, who looked to their king and the country of their origin in Great Britain. Lord Camden, reflecting the views of the Whigs, did what he thought best for peace.

Meantime the Confederation was swearing in conspirators, some of them intimidated by assassinations, and other forms of pressure ; and was gaining over the Militia, nearly all of whom took the oath as United Irishmen. At this time the English troops consisted only of some 10,000 or 11,000 Fencibles and invalids. It was a state of undeclared war, the advantage being with the conspiracy ; and later, in 1796, an Indemnity Act, an Insurrection Act, and an Act aimed at assassins had all to be passed.

About this time also the French Directory had sent over Count Richard O'Shea, an agent of their own, to give them an independent opinion of the prospects of the rebellion, and with certain powers. He was authorised to promise 10,000 French soldiers and arms for 20,000 men to be landed either in

Antrim or on the coast of Galway, so as to distract attention from Bantry Bay. The Directory wanted to invade after the rising. Wolfe Tone, very soundly, absolutely refused this.

In 1796 Lord Edward, whom the Directory long suspected as an agent of Pitt, as they could not believe he would have deserted his order, went out in June with a friend of the Whigs, Mr. Arthur O'Connor, to meet Reinhart, French Minister at Altona, and Hoche, in Switzerland,¹ and to make final and detailed arrangements for the invasion of Ireland, when it was agreed that Wolfe Tone and Napper Tandy were to be given commands. Lord Edward, with his devoted wife Pamela, who shared the labours of his intrigues, conducted his negotiations, chiefly at Hamburg, where the French Consul aided him, and helped him to negotiate loans for the cause. He was there aided, also, by the United Irish agents Lewins and Macnevin.

Wolfe Tone was not less active. He made efforts to get up a Scottish rising, and sat down for months at the Texel, from whence he described the "Bata-vian" fleet as far superior to that of the French at Brest.

His object was to persuade the Dutch to send the whole of their army of 15,000, and their fleet of some 15 battleships, to Ireland direct. He promised, in exchange, to indulge their zeal as converts, "by giving them the honour of establishing the first

¹ Cf. Desbrière, vol. i., p. 106, where Reinhart's letter to Delacroy is given, in which he answers for Fitzgerald with his head; also p. 112, footnote (²) about Hoche, which seems to show that the interview with him, at Basle, could only have occurred in August 1796.

Irish republic." The Directory, however, had no intention of allowing their new satellite to revolve in its own orbit, or in his, and insisted they must come into Brest harbour, and be joined by a French force of 5,000 men with ships. They intended to give the chief command to Hoche.

Knowing all this, and that a vast number of men—numbers that in 1798 are said to have exceeded half a million out of a million of able-bodied adults—had been sworn in,¹ including nearly nine-tenths of the Militia; and that possibly 150,000 to 200,000 were, in a measure, organised, and had arms secured for them, the Executive now raised some 30,000 Yeomanry, 18,000 of them mounted, and most of them Protestants. The above numbers rose to 50,000 in 1798, before the close of the fighting.

Camden, however, excluded the Orangemen, as such, against all local advice, on the plea of lessening religious bitterness, which was no longer avoidable. This act would have greatly lessened the chance of successful resistance to invasion, which was well known to be imminent.

The gallant, but unavoidably undisciplined yeomanry force, undoubtedly saved the situation; but the duties imposed on it should only have been entrusted to well-disciplined and non-partisan regulars.

Meantime Lord Carhampton, in command in the north, arrested the whole of the united Irish Executive Directory of Five in Belfast,² an illegal but

¹ One clause of the oath was "Loyalty and Fidelity to the United French and Irish nations."

² These five members of the Directory were Thomas Addis Emmett, A. O'Connor, Macniven, Bond, and MacCormick.

unavoidable act, after which Habeas Corpus was suspended. This beheaded and paralysed the organisation.

The French invasion of Ireland had long been talked about ; but, in the mind of Napoleon, and of some of the Directory, it was only to be an episode in the great designs of the former for attacking England in India. This latter proposal had entirely captured the officers of the French Navy, but the French Directory, as a whole, feared and were opposed to Napoleon, and looked on the distinguished Hoche as their saviour. He and Carnot, both of whom died in 1797, favoured the Irish proposal.

Napoleon had no objection to the fleet carrying Hoche and his army to Ireland, provided it only landed him, and left him to sink or swim ; while it returned for his purposes. Hoche wanted the fleet to remain with him, while the Navy had no wish to hang on in a British port with the constant prospect of attack.

Even the energy of Hoche failed to get the preparations expedited. Napoleon was meantime occupied with his Italian campaign ; and the Directory, late in the year, decided to enforce action, and replaced Villaret-Joyeuse, whose views coincided with those of Napoleon, in his command at Brest, by Vice-Admiral Morard de Galles, who it was hoped would be more amenable.

At the same time they took the strong measure of making Hoche the Admiral Commanding-in-Chief for the expedition ; a measure that was very distasteful to the Navy. They did it, no doubt, because they were sure of Hoche, but not of de Galles, and

as the lesser of two evils ; but it was an evil, and circumstances frustrated their aims.

Desbrière gives a most amusing account of the efforts of de Galles to get out of the business. He pleaded, to the Directory, his own professional incapacity, his defective eyesight, and his many physical infirmities. Their answer was to make him a full admiral, but of later date than Hoche.

On December 15 and 16, 1796, the expedition sailed from Brest, losing a battleship in the exit, with 16 ships of the line, 13 frigates, 4 corvettes, 1 vaisseau rasé, and 4 transports, 38 in all ; taking 13,879, or with staff, about 14,000 men. They successfully evaded the British blockade,¹ but Admiral Lord Bridport got the news between the 20th and 22nd. He reported he would be ready to go to sea on the 25th. On that day only eight ships succeeded in reaching St. Helens against the wind, and the admiral stayed there till January 3, three days before the last French ships left Bantry Bay. Desbrière criticises his conduct severely.²

A rendezvous had been fixed forty leagues out from Brest ; and precise orders, in case of separation, had been laid down. The Directory had definitely ruled that the troops were to disembark, and the fleet to return at once. Sealed orders were given to be opened at sea, and it was left to Hoche to decide where the force was to disembark, on opening them.

¹ Cf. Desbrière, i. pp. 165-6, who quotes the embarkation state. Laird Clowes, in his "History of the British Navy," vol. iv. pp. 300-2, gives the total number of vessels as 43 ; perhaps with reason, as some may have followed. See also Desbrière, i. pp. 118-9.

² Cf. Desbrière, i. p. 219.

This discretion had not been expected, and meantime the naval officers had decided on Bantry Bay as the nearest possible place, and the one that suited them best, as in 1689-90.

Hoche had passed the rendezvous, when the Directory wrote to him to say it had abandoned the expedition to Ireland, and wanted him in Paris.¹

The wind was high, and the crews of hardy Bretons, who had been long in port, were unavoidably a little rusty, and had not got their sea legs. The expedition consequently broke up.

Hoche, with 5 battleships, 6 frigates, and the vaisseau rasé, got separated, and Vice-Admiral Bouvet, with 11 battleships, 7 frigates, 3 corvettes, and 4 transports, found themselves off Bantry Bay on December 20.

On the 20th to 21st, he was discovered by the brig *Kangaroo*, which reported to Cuxhaven, and the news reached Admiral Kingsmill and General Dalrymple, at Cork, on the 22nd.

Hoche, with scattered ships, moved wide up the west coast towards the Shannon estuary. Bouvet's fleet carried, it is said, only 6,400 men, under Grouchy, the senior officer, with whom were Humbert, Harty, O'Shea, and Wolfe Tone. The weather in the bay was very stormy. A council of war met with difficulty on the 23rd, and decided on disembarking. Bouvet asked for the decision in writing. Grouchy wrote by packet to the Directory, saying he would disembark on the 25th. The 24th

¹ Cf. Desbrière, i. p. 170. He does not mention whether Hoche got this, which he may have later; but remarks, "It is difficult to give a plausible explanation of this singular retreat."

was fine, and probably suitable for the operation. The 25th was again very stormy, and in the evening Bouvet, in the *Immortalité*, making the general signal to leave, and carrying away Grouchy with him, went to sea, and made for home, reaching Brest on January 1.¹

The 26th was again very stormy, but improved on the 27th, when disembarkment was possible. Generals Cherin Humbert and Harty, with Captain Bedout, were at a council of war on that day, and, as there were now only 4,000 men, it was decided not to land; but, in consequence of a statement by Captain Bedout of the Navy, that *his instructions were to go to the mouth of the Shannon*, the council resolved to go there.

They left at 4 p.m. Bedout made the mouth of the Shannon, and at once headed for Brest, where he arrived on January 1. The rest were compelled by the heavy seas to make for home, individually, as best they could. Some were lost.²

It is difficult to understand why Bouvet, in such rough weather, did not anchor his fleet, when first it arrived, in the extensive and land-locked anchorage of Berehaven, where there are good holding ground, little current, and no sea.

The bay was empty on the 28th, but between December 29 and January 1, 4 French battle-ships, 5 frigates, and 1 corvette came into it. These were ships separated with Hoche. On January 2, the Commodore, Captain Linois, of the *Nestor*, assembled a naval and military council of

¹ Cf. Desbrière, i. pp. 171, 202, and 203-6.

² Cf. Desbrière, i. pp. 207-9. Also reference to de Jonné's romance.

war, as 4,000 soldiers were available. The council, as councils generally do, decided against landing, though the weather from the 29th of December till the 6th of January, had been good. They left on the latter day, and went home.

No English war ship looked up the invaders from December 20 to January 6.

On the 7th, the *Trajan*, with General Loches, after two days at the mouth of the Shannon, approached Bantry Bay, and was chased, it is said, by four English war ships, but got home on January 14.¹

On the 29th, Hoche, in the *Fraternile*, with all the army funds on board, was joined by the *Révolution* and the *Scevola*, and heard on the 30th from Captain Hamelin, of the *Tortue*, that Bouvet had left; which, "the generals concluded, meant a total retreat." This is strange, when they must have known from the captain of the *Révolution*, which was with them, that, with the exception of Bouvet's own vessel, none had left when his cables parted and he was blown out to sea. Hoche was the last man to desert his comrades, and it is difficult to believe that, on such slender evidence, he would have failed in his duty to visit the bay; there must have been something else.²

Though the troops did not land, the expedition encouraged disaffection in Ireland, and also showed the grave momentary weakness of the British fleet. There were few signs of enthusiasm for the French in Kerry. The sequel will be referred to later.

Guillon mentions that the French Directory, on

¹ Cf. Desbrière, i., p. 210.

² Cf. Desbrière, i., pp. 209-13.

Bouvet's return, deprived him of his command and his rank. He also quotes an interesting letter from Hoche to the Directory, in consequence of a statement, made by Grouchy, before Hoche returned, that he had no orders. This Hoche, in his letter, entirely disproves, and, in doing so, shows he had concurred in Bantry Bay as the place for the landing.

A curious effort was made in Wales by the French Directory about the time of Hoche's expedition. Hoche, who had a bitter experience of the guerilla warfare, which began in 1793 in la Vendée, where the Chouans had given him much trouble; conceived the idea of starting a "Chouannerie" in Ireland, by landing small groups of men at many points, and la Barollière suggested the employment of criminals.

Wolfe Tone, when consulted, said it would upset his rebellion to bring convicts into Ireland, as their immorality would be repugnant to the Irish, but suggested it would be just the thing for England!

The groups were to be formed of galley slaves and army deserters, and other army incorrigibles. Of these army criminals, two "Légions de Francs" were raised by Humbert, who had been detailed to take them to England in October 1796, but, eventually, he and O'Shea each commanded one of the two that went to Bantry Bay.²

Tate, who was from the United States, and called himself a Colonel, had offered himself to the Directory as a pirate who was ready for a job, and was accepted; and Hoche, on December 11, 1796,

¹ Cf. Guillon, 295 and 293.

² Cf. Desbrière, i., pp. 136, 238, 244.

informed the Directory he had ready for him 600 galley slaves he meant to keep in irons till embarked, and also 600 jail birds, in all his prisons, the whole to be clad in English uniforms taken at Quiberon.

Captain Castagnier, with four small war ships, was to take over Tate, who embarked with his "Légion Noire" of 1,050 men; about the middle of February 1797. He had instructions to make a feint in Somerset; then to take, loot, and burn Bristol; or, failing that, to land in Cardigan Bay and march to Liverpool, which was to be similarly treated.

The naval commander came into the Bristol Channel, and not fancying an attempt on Bristol, went to Fishguard in Cardigan Bay, and put his cargo on shore, about February 22: their only supplies were a musket and 200 rounds apiece.

The ships went home, and Lord Cawdor, with the Cardiganshire Militia and Colonel Know's battalion of Fencibles, and with a few Yeomanry, rounded them up. Tate, the mildest of buccaneers, had the impudence to ask for terms, and when refused, surrendered at discretion. His poor devils, with no wish to fight, were glad enough to get something to eat.¹

Pitt, with sound irony, returned them, as undesirable aliens, to the country of their origin, and to the Directory that did not want them. Had Tate succeeded, the Directory contemplated similar attacks in Northumberland, Durham, and Yorkshire. The Council of 500 condemned their act.

We have to recollect that the effectiveness of our

¹ Cf. "The Fishguard Invasion by the French in 1797," by M. E. James; also cf. Guillon, pp. 296 to 300.

naval pressure on France was very severe, and there was intense bitterness there. Even in 1793 the revolutionary Government decreed that Pitt was the enemy of the human race.

In March 1797 General Lake was ordered to disarm the rebellion in Ulster, where, by proclamation and severity, he got in over 70 guns, many no doubt shipped from France, and perhaps 50,000 to 60,000 small arms, as well as some 60,000 pikes. The Grattan group now seceded from Parliament, throwing the blame on those who had, against their advice, refused to give political ascendancy to a population in actual and active rebellion.

Lord Carhampton, the Commander-in-Chief, was replaced by the gallant Sir R. Abercromby, as representing the leniency of the Whigs. He condemned, with justice, the discipline of the various auxiliary branches of the Army in Ireland; but he also refused to disarm the Munster insurgents, only a month before the rebellion broke out, so that absolutely essential task fell, again, on Lake.

Meantime the Executive arrested the whole of the Leinster committee. Lord Edward, the Commander-in-Chief, escaped till May 21, 1798, when, after killing Captain Ryan in the attempt to avoid arrest, he was wounded and died; and the capture of other leaders followed. The insurrection broke out on May 23, the appointed day. The able writer of the "Foundations of Reform" puts the numbers of the various forces in Ireland at this time at 25,000 Regulars and Fencibles, 26,000 British and Irish Militia, and 35,000 Yeomanry and Volunteers. Total 86,000, of whom very few were Regulars. Between June and July, 1798, further

drafts to Ireland consisted of five Regular and twelve Militia units.

The rising failed at Dublin: the soldiers were attacked and many killed in Kildare; and it was crushed in Carlow; the fighting being everywhere very savage on both sides.

The rebels had mastered Wexford, and had some success, till Needham's defeat of them at Arklow, and till General Lake on June 21, completely broke them up at Vinegar Hill, just after the arrival of Camden's successor, Lord Cornwallis, who, wrongly, considered the Northern Jacobins as wholly responsible, and treated them with great severity, and, equally wrongly, thought the Catholic Nationalists were their innocent victims.

Under the advice of Fitzgibbon, now Lord Clare, and the one man of all others who understood Ireland, and who, throughout, had saved the situation, an amnesty was wisely offered to all who would lay down their arms.

As usual this was taken as a sign of weakness; the guerilla war went on, and many of the northern leaders were hanged in Dublin. When the end came, there were some seventy prisoners gravely implicated; some of whom the Irish Executive held should be dealt with like those in the north.

The seventy offered, if their lives were spared, to confess all. Cornwallis accepted their offer. Among them was Mr. Arthur O'Connor, a gentleman of means, education, and personal charm, and one of the five on the Executive Directory, as well as one of the triumvirate which arranged, in France, for the invasion of Ireland.

He was an intimate friend of many of the Whigs,

who, when he was being tried for seditious libel, tumbled over each other to swear, with generous elasticity of conscience, that he was a superman positively tottering under the weight of his super-abundant "piety," and that to think such an one could have stooped to sedition, would be treason to humanity itself. So they swore him, for the time, into the haven of security. He was deputed by the other sixty-nine to make their confession, and, with neck secured, he announced, in effect, that of all record-breakers in treason, he had taken the palm; and that second to him, but *longo intervallo*, which was quite true, came his sixty-nine comrades in adversity.

A demagogue at large is tempted to say much, when he runs no risk, but it was not handsome to his Whig saviours, who had strained their consciences to the breaking-point, and beyond it, to the danger of their country, to have it announced, *urbi et orbi*, that they had perjured themselves to save him.

Their example was a bad one of uneven-handed justice, and the confession put them to silence politically, as Cornwallis intended it should.

The American Minister asked that the United States should be one of the countries to which these seventy would not be allowed to go, and, on behalf of his republic, he declined to receive them on account of the danger of their doctrines.

While brigandage was still proceeding, the French Directory, whose hopes of a successful invasion of England had been blasted, for the present, by our naval victories at St. Vincent, and later at Camperdown, now made a belated effort to prolong the rebellion.

They prepared a force called the Army of Ireland, of some 13,000 men ; an advanced guard under Humbert, with 1,000 men and four guns from Rochelle ; a support of about 3,000 men under Hardy, from Brest ;¹ a main body of 9,000 men under General Kilmaine, to sail after the others, but which never did.

The Directory had, according to Desbrière, a specific assurance that the Irish Militia would not oppose the French, a fact no doubt communicated to Humbert, who, with 5 frigates, a corvette, and a cutter, landed at and took Killala in Co. Mayo, on August 22, 1798, having sailed on the 6th.²

After a little delay to collect Celtic support, he had a small success at Ballina, and marched to Castlebar, where, with his excellent staff officer and troop leader, Sarrazin, he met and defeated Lake, with from 1,600 to 1,700 men. The Irish Militia at Castlebar were the Kerry's, the Kilkenny's, and the Longford's. Of these the bulk of the rank and file had been sworn in as "United Irishmen," a matter that was, probably, communicated to Humbert by the Militia themselves, or by their friends who had joined him, and which was the cause of his success. The Irish have no want of courage, so these treacherous battalions must have gone into action with Lake, intending to betray him. The first to go were the Kilkenny and the Longford

¹ Desbrière, ii. p. 140, gives the numbers as 2,800, and at p. 179 as 4,000. The former is the more likely.

² While serving in Ireland in 1885-8, I was engaged on a Piers and Roads Commission, and saw much of the south and west coasts of Ireland, including the landing place at Killala, which is convenient for boats and sheltered from the prevailing winds. There were only fifty men in it when taken. It had no defences.

Militia, and the Galway Volunteers; and some of them then transferred to the French service, and put on French uniform.

There were 100 men of the 6th regiment, a small body of Lord Rodden's horse, and the Royal Irish Artillery, with 11 guns, of which 9 were taken. These all behaved well, as did also the newly raised Fraser Fencibles,¹ who were landed, I think, at Killala in the previous year. The men came chiefly from the Aird and Stratherrick, and were commanded at Castlebar by Colonel Simon Fraser the younger. There they fought devotedly to the last.

Lake, reporting to Cornwallis later, on the general condition of the Irish Militia, said the Louth Militia were staunch; but nothing could be done with the others, which were suspect.

Humbert followed up his success at Castlebar by at once organising, on paper, the province of Connaught, as a department of the Irish republic, which he formally proclaimed. He ought to have been moving, instead of talking. Advancing, after some days' delay, further inland, he was defeated on September 8 at Ballinamuck, and surrendered to Lake.

Humbert had the qualities of a leader. Untaught, impulsive, domineering; he had the saving grace of driving power and resolution, and his men fought, at great odds, with the courage of Frenchmen, and war-trained veterans, which they were.

He had, of course, to live on the country, but he kept his men well in hand. The thousands of rebels who were misled into following him, with no

¹ See Musgrave's "History of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1798."

trace of discipline, wrecked the houses and property of the gentry and tradesmen, provoking reprisals from which they were the greatest sufferers.

Napper Tandy, in the *Anacreon*, who got away from Dunkerque about the same time as Humbert from Brest, carried with him some artillery men and ammunition and many Irishmen from France.

Tandy was a very precautionary revolutionary, and would not risk going to Killala, but ventured to land on Inishmore, the greater Arran island in Galway Bay, a landing, the difficulty of which I have often experienced myself.

Arriving there on September 16, he learnt of Humbert's surrender, and forthwith got on board. Sailing north-east, round Scotland, he reached Bergen in Sweden, and thence got back to Dunkerque after a long delay.

On September 16, Admiral Bompard, with ten war ships, sailed from Brest with Hardy and his force of 3,000. He was brilliantly shepherded by British cruisers off and on, up to Achil Head, where they joined Admiral Warren. Sailing north and east Bompard ran into Warren's squadron, of rather superior strength, in the direction of Tory Island, on the north-west coast of Donegal. Warren's ships captured all of Bompard's except two or three small vessels which got home. But for the cruisers, Bompard might have made the land.

In the *Hoche* was Wolfe Tone, who was taken, tried, and committed suicide. He was not much over thirty years of age; was the ablest of the leaders; and had the qualities generally lacking on the Celtic side. He, and others of his Jacobin colleagues, had supplied the organising power, the

cool-headedness, the persistency, and the resolution that carried the rebellion to the point of striking, and distinguished it from most of its predecessors.

The pages of Desbrière teem with evidence of his activity and, on the whole, of the soundness of the information he gave the Directory, which my own knowledge of the south and west coasts of Ireland enables me to confirm. It was the force of his character that empowered him to keep that body to its engagement to invade. He was the most formidable enemy Britain had in Ireland.

On October 12, Commandant Savary, who had piloted Humbert, sailed again, with a division of 3 frigates and 3 smaller vessels, from Rochelle, with 1,090 men on board to support him.

Arriving at Killala on October 27, he learnt of Humbert's surrender, and the dangers he was exposed to; and, without landing, cut his cables and made for home, after throwing some of his guns overboard.¹

The last attempt was the starting of two Dutch frigates from the Texel, with 300 French and Dutch troops for Ireland, on October 24, 1798. They were captured in succession by H.M.S. *Sirius*, as they came out. These efforts at invasion were ill-combined, ill-timed, and spasmodic; and marked the absence of the supreme leader, who left for Egypt just before the Irish rebellion broke out.

Between May and October 1798, therefore, the Directory planned seven expeditions, of which five sailed, and only one operated on land. This was due to the victories of St. Vincent and Duncan, and to the fact that the Navy was freed by them to

¹ Cf. Desbrière, ii. pp. 182-90 and 211-3.

operate on the Irish coasts, which it was apparently debarred from doing during Hoche's invasion, owing to the danger to England itself, and, perhaps, to other causes.

These five expeditions seem to have sailed under British colours.

It is noticeable that the old Irish families that retired to France in 1691 did not figure in the revolutionary efforts to invade Ireland in 1796-8.

In the case of the Armada, and of many other attempts to invade us, we have seen how, for centuries, the uncertainties of weather were constantly in our favour, as long as sails were the means of propulsion. Now, however, by the introduction of steam, a mastery over the elements has been gradually acquired.

If a low speed, compared with the highest capacity, be the basis of calculations, steamships can now, to a great extent, be relied upon to arrive up to time; while concentration of squadrons, on the same basis, can be arranged by chronometer, with comparative certainty, even if at considerable distances apart.

In Hoche's invasion, the east-south-east wind carried his expedition quickly to Ireland; but was so violent that the bulk of it was separated from its Commander-in-Chief and Admiral in one, and also from the larger part of the army of invasion; and was kept separate by the westerly storms that followed, and that discouraged a landing; while the Dutch expedition, at the time of its greatest opportunity, was penned in by the west wind, when Duncan was unable to stop it on account of the Mutiny of the Nore.

The advantage, therefore, now passes to the offensive, which knows the secret of its objective, and therefore to the invader rather than to the invaded, which had it in the past; hence, in our case, the chapter of accidents on which, in the course of centuries, we came to rely, is one with very few pages left for our comfort.

Measured on the water-line, and including indentations and estuaries, the coast of Ireland is over 2,500 miles long, while that of the mainland of Great Britain is about 4,800, exclusive of the Isle of Wight, Isle of Man, and all the other islands.

The protection of 2,500 miles of sea-coast frontier, even by a Navy that could detach sufficiently to be superior in those waters, proved, as we have seen, to be a very difficult task, and is now very much more difficult with steam than in sailing days, even with Ireland in the military control of Great Britain, as it then was. With Ireland in the hands of a Separatist Government, when all the ports there, except those in Ulster, would be at the disposal of our enemies, it would, with our present and prospective naval means, be next to impossible if at war with a great European power. Those who were then charged with the defence of Ireland from the land had, though frequently supported by the Navy on sea, to be prepared for all contingencies, and, to meet Humbert's raid, turned out a force put at 100,000 men by a singularly well-informed military writer. In any case it must have been very large indeed, as the "States" of the time show.

Cornwallis wisely made the Shannon his line of defence, instead of attempting the impossible task of defending the whole west coast. It is true the

force was composed almost entirely of troops with no training comparable to that of war-trained Regulars, and therefore ill-equipped to face them on even superior terms; but they belonged to a strenuous race: were horsemen, and at home in the country, and very different from the pale-faced denizens of the towns, while they were led by those they knew, and who generally commanded and justified their respect.

Humbert gained the prestige of a first success at Castlebar by the treachery of his opponents; but the way he moved about among the loyal but ill-trained troops sent to stop him, showed, once for all, that a resolute invader, with the impetus of the attack, and with his life in his hands, cannot be stopped effectively, and at once, except by troops in all points at least as good and as numerous as his own.

It cost us dearly to learn that lesson then, and it applies to the future as well as to the past, though at present we seem to have forgotten it, as completely as if history had never been written.

The military mystery of Hoche's expedition must now be considered. When first arranged in February 1796, the general idea was looked at by Bonaparte, and, at all events, not disapproved; but he positively declined to command it, or to let the ships that took over the troops remain there, though he stuck to his fleet when he went to Egypt himself.

He was too great a student of war to have omitted to study the records of the invasion of 1689, in the Ministry of War, and his belief in Irish revolutions was not strengthened thereby.

At that time he had grandiose visions ; suggested perhaps by those of Duplix, who died in 1763 ; and undoubtedly due also to our difficulties with the Maratha powers, and with Tipoo Saib.

He thought of using Egypt and the Isle de France as the stepping stones, and Tipoo Saib and the Marathas as the pivots, for the conquest of India ; whence, when the Directory had duly hanged itself, he meant to return, taking Europe *en revers*.

With these ideas, he had proposed that Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, with fifteen vessels, should carry and land the troops at Bantry Bay, and return to carry reinforcements to Mysore. Hoche insisted he should retain his ships, as well as the troops ; but, on starting, he found that Napoleon's will had prevailed, and his sailing orders forbade it. It is possible that these orders had become known to the troops, and conceivable that it disinclined them to leave their ships ; but there were other reasons, some of them already given.

In 1794, France, as already mentioned, incorporated Holland and her Navy of some thirty sail of the line. In July 1796 she effected a convention which made Spain her appanage, and brought with it her fleet of forty sail of the line. It was the Triple Alliance of 1780 over again. These two contingents, with the fleet at Brest, would have given her a hundred sail of the line, in addition to the ships at Toulon. The Spanish agreement was confined to hostilities with England, and, with prophetic instinct, to the early annexation of Portugal, so as to shut the former out of the Continent.

Hoche's invasion had been promised in February 1794. Meantime the gravity of our position was

greatly increased by the temper of the British Navy.

As early as 1794 mutiny in the British Fleet had occurred in the *Culloden*¹ and *Windsor Castle*; and unrest, though dormant, in the next two years made itself felt, and may possibly account, in a measure, for the immunity of the Hoche expedition on its way to, and during its stay in Ireland, in December 1796; and, as far as Admiral Lord Bridport's fleet is concerned, on its way back. The *Culloden's* crew refused to go to sea—mutiny severely suppressed. Those of the *Windsor Castle* objected to their officers, and were given new ones!

The men had undoubtedly many and hard grievances that the Admiralty and the Cabinet had too long neglected. The *personnel* was a very mixed one, only held together by a necessarily severe discipline, that human indiscretion sometimes abused, but one that, in view of the circumstances and the qualities of the *personnel*, had had a success more triumphant than any one can recall in the annals of war, and secured splendid fighting qualities in the men.

Matters must have gone far when, in February 1797, Petitions, said to be from all the crews at Portsmouth, were sent up to the Admiralty through Lord Howe, who commanded. They seem to have been ignored.

On April 15, when Admiral Lord Bridport at Spithead ordered the fleet to prepare for sea, the mutiny broke out at once, the delegates of the

¹ Cf. W. Laird Clowes's "History of the British Royal Navy," vol. iv. pp. 167-81.

men hoisting the red flag of the French Revolution in the *Royal George*.

On May 7, on the occasion, it is said, of a false rumour of a French fleet coming out of Brest, every ship's company refused Bridport's order to get ready for sea.

The men's delegates went to H.M.S. *London*, fired at and wounded an officer, and forced their way on board, till the Marines fired, and shot several of them. They then forced the naval officers and the Marines to surrender. On May 15 the matter had been adjusted by an Act of Parliament hastily passed.

About the 18th a mutiny occurred at Sheerness, when the men took charge and hoisted the red flag there also.

On the 24th, Admiral Duncan took out his fleet, which had to observe the Dutch under de Winter at the Texel, and all but two deserted, and went back to blockade London in the Thames; Parker, who had been a naval officer, acting as leader. They kept discipline on shipboard, but turned pirates, looted the merchant ships and the sheep-folds on shore, and attacked and fired on non-mutinous ships. The matter came to an end in June, but sporadic cases later in 1797 occurred in nine or ten ships, some of them in the West Indies and at the Cape of Good Hope, and others as late as 1801.

The Marines had never failed to support authority, and in 1802 the King gave them the title of Royal Marines.

It is not conceivable that the mutineers, who were so patriotic before and after the mutiny,

would, of their own motion, have so gravely risked their country at the crisis of her fate. There can be little doubt it was instigated by the combined leaders of the French and Irish revolutionaries, and it was an open boast of the latter, before, and in 1797, that the corruption of the Fleet was the best card in their hand.

Pitt had to bring in a Bill to prevent, and punish, attempts to seduce seamen, and another to make communication with the mutineers a felony.

To corrupt the Fleet was a Napoleonic idea; and in the art of undermining foreign Governments with a view to annexation, the missionaries of the revolution, like the lately discovered disease-carriers, showed an extraordinary power of transmitting the bacillus of anarchy, in preaching their gospel of humanity, always with the alternative, "My belief or my bayonet." In this case, however, they could not have acted without their Irish allies and without a "nidus" in that British "ark of the covenant," the Fleet. At that time there were an unusually large number of Irish in the Navy: Wolfe Tone had pressed on the French that the Fleet was chiefly manned by Irish, as a reason for an invasion to separate Ireland from Great Britain, whom, he declared, could not maintain her fleets without them; and Grattan, in 1795, talking at random, and ignorant of the figures, put the numbers at 80,000, to emphasise the urgency of the Bill for Catholic emancipation. Both statements were gross exaggerations, but there were many at sea.¹

¹ Pelham's return of soldiers and sailors in 1793-6, a little earlier, showed that Ireland usually contributed comparatively few to either service.

The vast majority of them, I doubt not, were as loyal and true as they have always proved themselves to be in the regular Army; but when in 1796 and 1797 large numbers of United Irish suspects, many of them undoubtedly "de facto" rebels, were, with extraordinary folly, sent, untried, into the Fleet, the nidus was provided.

General Lake protested in his letters against this un wisdom, which, he foretold, would corrupt the Fleet; and stated that the men, when told they would be sent, said they would "gladly go to corrupt the sailors and settle the business." It would be childish to blame them: the blame lay on those who sent them, and on the unsound system of naval recruitment. Lecky, I think, mentions that 1,000 were sent to the Navy at one time, a time when Ireland had been for years in a state of revolution and on the verge of civil war; he adds that the English Government employed a Roman Catholic priest to appease the Irish mutineers.

French revolutionary literature, probably translated, and possibly edited by the staff of the Irish Directory, was spread abroad in Sheerness, where the mutineers, at first, came ashore every day in great mobs; and, if the traditions of 1797-8 are true, there was a distinct understanding that the crews would bring some of the ships into Irish as well as into French ports.¹

¹ Lecky quotes evidence of French intervention in Moreau de Jonné's "*Aventures de Guerre*," Ed. 1858. I took the trouble to read this amusing French novel, a naval and military "Romance of War." Bantry Bay and the Mutiny are dealt with in vol. i., and Killala in vol. ii. The writer, a master gunner, aged twenty, starts with a smuggler and a Government "agent," destined for the mutineers

In the ships off the Irish coast, mutiny also prevailed, and St. Vincent himself dealt drastically with H.M.S. *Marlborough* when she joined him from Admiral Kingsmill's command in Ireland, between 1793 and 1799, when the naval task, carried out under great difficulties, was rendered more difficult still owing to the temper of some crews. That of the *Marlborough* was in the Spithead mutiny; and gave trouble later in Bantry Bay, and again on the way to St. Vincent's fleet. This deplorable occurrence impresses the lesson that there is nothing certain in war but the emergence of "the unexpected."

Next time it may be a general coal strike, or railway strike, or both, engineered in the Continents of Europe and America, by the "Internationale," and supported by its English commune here, to stop a war that both disapprove of, by disarming Britain when about to be attacked.

As already mentioned, France seemed, for the of the Nore, from Brest, for England. After sanguinary struggles de Jonné finds himself the sole survivor in a lugger, which runs away with him in a gale. He is overhauled by a midshipman in a cutter, who mistakes him for the French emissary; carries him on board H.M.S. *Sandwich*, just as the Naval Lords arrive to try to make a settlement. He introduces him, and hands him over, as a French agent, to Parker. That an English officer should do so, could only mean he was an accomplice of mutiny, and is inconceivable. de Jonné urges Parker to take the fleet to Brest; writes there to aid him; and finally sees him hanged, and himself escapes to Brest. Still such a *tour de force* could never have been thought of, if the fact of French efforts had not been well known at the time.

Desbrière, i. pp. 254-6, suggests that many Irishmen in the Navy were members of rebel secret societies, and had a hand in the mutiny. He naturally says nothing about French intervention.

first time in many years, to be on the road to secure the provision of naval superiority in the Channel, and it is quite possible that Napoleon and Hoche knew the considerable progress that had been made, by the efforts to tamper with the crews of the fleets of Britain. Indeed, the immunity Hoche's expedition experienced at sea must have struck so perceptive a mind as that of Napoleon ; and with his unequalled grasp of a military situation, he doubtless saw the unexpected chance for a blow at the heart of England. He was at the time, it is true, campaigning in Italy, but he never ceased to influence the war with us, and his agents in Paris were powerful. Anyhow, something had happened.

Hoche died the following September, and his own reports on the subject are unknown to the public ; but the Marquis de Grouchy has shown that he was greatly disgusted with the delays, and wrote to the Directory on December 8, 1796, advising the abandonment of the enterprise ; and, as already stated, that the orders of the Directory, giving effect to his view, arrived too late for the departure of the 15th. It seems, therefore, that the prospect of greater events may have taken the heart out of the enterprise.

Vice-Admiral Kingsmill's squadron, with headquarters at Cork, which had to watch the north of Ireland as well, never appeared during the seventeen days of the French occupation of Bantry Bay. Nor did Lord Bridport's fleet get touch of the French from start to finish. This looks as if due to the temper of the crews ; but there may have been naval strategical reasons, based on secret information, connected, perhaps, with the approaching attempt to

unite the French and Spanish fleets, and of which a soldier is no judge.

We do not know the real intention of the Directory when they suddenly decided to send Hoche to Ireland. It is not even certain whether they intended him to land. It was hoped that the Spanish fleet would soon effect its junction ; but the Directory had got accustomed to delays in Spain.

The Hoche expedition may have been sent, pending the great event, as a demonstration to stimulate the Irish revolution, to test the rumours of mutiny in the English Fleet, to distract England from the true attack intended for her coasts, to hold the English Regulars in Ireland, and to tempt England to reinforce there, and so facilitate the invasion of England itself. Then we have the complete reversal of intention, dispatched to Hoche after he had left, and which he may not have received, though it is quite possible he may have been recalled, later, off Ireland.

This makes it probable that France had been unexpectedly successful in getting the Spanish to push on their preparations, so as to be ready to sail shortly, as they actually did, in the first week of February, when Napoleon's success in Italy seemed assured. In such case it may have seemed desirable to get back both fleet and army from Ireland for the great event that would follow the junction of the French and Spanish fleets.

Desbrière only quotes the sense of the letter abandoning the expedition, which, however, exists in the "Archives de Guerre" ;¹ but we do not know what instructions accompanied it. Without some

¹ Cf. Desbrière, i., p. 170, footnote (1) for reference.

such explanation, it is inconceivable that the Directory could have so stultified itself, by throwing away the preparations of years, and an object that would have created very great difficulties for Britain.

The serious lesson of this expedition for us is that, in spite of "a fleet in being" in Portsmouth, and others at the Nore and at Cork, the French sent, at least, 34 warships from Brest to Ireland, with 14,000 troops, stayed there seventeen days, and left unmolested to the end.

While these things were going on, in the early weeks of 1797, Britain was in a dangerous position, occupied with rebellion, and threatened invasion, in Ireland, with the loyalty of the fleets worse than doubtful, and without enough reliable land forces to oppose to the war-trained officers and soldiers of France ; and, worst of all, in face of the possibility of losing the command of the sea.

The chances of the invaders were never brighter. However, the critical movement of the Spanish fleet to Brest ended on February 14, 1797, in the priceless victory at St. Vincent, after which it was possible for Great Britain to send, by degrees, 15,000 regular troops into Ireland ; while Duncan's splendid success at Camperdown in October, when the quondam mutineers won back their place among the immortals of the sea, restored once more the balance of sea power to Britain.

Napoleon, after the Treaty of Campo Formio, in Italy, returned to Paris on December 5, 1797, to command the "army of England," but to find the great naval combinations he had hoped for, and doubtless planned, completely frustrated, and only retrievable after years of fresh naval construction

which he initiated.¹ He reverted to his Indian dreams, and prepared accordingly. Sailing from Toulon on May 13, 1798, with from 36,000 to 40,000 men, he evaded the greatest sea captain of any age, whom he further baffled by landing in Egypt, while his back was turned, and occupying the country.

There was, however, a strategical continuity in his dreams; for they were the sequence of the successful efforts of the Kings of France and Spain to transfer the theatre of war to America; where they saw their way to combine with our revolted Colonists; while the political sequence was Napoleon's action in 1812, when, with more than Bismarckian guile, he manœuvred us, once more, into a war with the United States, to lighten the naval and military pressure we put upon him in Europe.

England, free for the moment from the threat of invasion at home, was able to make provision for whatever France might attempt as a diversion in Ireland. Having replaced Napoleon in Egypt, she could keep open the road to India, and, in doing so, frustrate his fixed idea of returning to the Nile, where he sent Sebastiani, in 1803, to report on the means of recovering it. Above all, pending the great and final struggle with him, there was time to prepare, as Pitt and his Ministers did, an immense fleet of war ships to secure our sea supremacy.²

¹ Cf. Desbrière, i. p. 387. Napoleon, writing to the Executive Directory on February 23, 1798, on the question of invasion, begins by saying, "Whatever efforts we may make from now, we shall not for many years gain the supremacy at sea."

² Lord Melville, as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1804, stated that he had built or was building 166 vessels of war in his first year of office.

To anticipate a little, in 1802, Napoleon's agents, during the peace of Amiens, terminated on March 27, 1802, succeeded in getting up a fresh movement among the Irish Jacobins. Robert Emmett, who, with his brother, had been in Wolfe Tone's rebellion, took the lead ; he went to Paris about the end of 1802, and on several occasions had interviews with Bonaparte, who had done the spade-work with his army of "agents provocateurs."

The usual processes were gone through, and July 23rd was fixed for the rising, which broke out in Dublin, where troops had not been brought in.

The mob held Dublin till troops arrived, and murdered the Chief Justice, Lord Kilwarden, and his nephew, both of whom, with his daughter, were taken out of his carriage for the purpose, while the daughter, hurrying on foot to Dublin Castle, was the first to bring the news of the murders. Arms, green uniforms, and a proclamation to start a provisional Government were found. Emmett was taken and hanged. The Catholics did not join the rising, feeling, perhaps, that, under the Union, their civil and religious liberties would be secured in time ; as they actually were, though with regrettable delay, in 1829.

The rebellion of 1798 showed that, while religious animosities were as virulent as ever, the religious motive among the Catholics was much weaker than the Nationalism to which it was harnessed. We see that a sectional Parliament, with complete legislative independence, could not prevent rebellion. Though constantly threatened with invasion, it had been free from all foreign attack in Ireland till after the rising had been put down ; but, when that rising

took place, the Irish Executive, supported by all the Protestants in Ireland, including those shut out from influence in the Home Rule Parliament, succeeded, mainly with its own levies, in suppressing the rebellion. It is important to note that, unlike 1690, the British Executive held the great harbours on the south, as well as the others, and the important commercial harbours and their rivers. It also held the communications and the fortified posts; in fact, the material military resources of the country—what the Separatist parties call “the armed plant of a revolution,” and for which they are always longing—and it also had better and more secure communications with England as a base.

The incursion of the influence of the French Revolution greatly aided the rebellion, for causes already referred to; this was a set-off to the fact that France, for her own reasons, did not fulfil her pledge to invade in force. Had Hoche's invasion landed, and been pushed with 18,000 to 20,000 war-trained men, and with the advantage of the initiative, the untrained forces of the Irish Executive, even if twice or thrice their numbers, would most probably have failed to stop them; and it is difficult to see what Great Britain could have done until she had largely increased the trained land forces at her disposal.

Then she would have been forced, with the support of the loyal Irish of all creeds, to reconquer Ireland in Franco-Celtic hands, holding all the military resources of the country; an effort that would have taught her the lesson that it is harder to turn people out than to keep them out.

The great advantage of the *beati possidetis* in the matter of territorial resources is often lost sight of in a military appreciation. If, for instance, Mr. Fox and his followers had entirely got their own way, and made the Independent Home Rule Government pass entire Catholic Emancipation with all its consequences, the Catholic majority would have ousted the others, including the Catholic gentry, and there would have arisen a new Sectional Home Rule Parliament, whose first object would have been to get military possession of those war resources of the country already referred to. With these, the business of introducing the foreign invader would have been relatively simple; and then they could have proceeded, on the lines of Tyrconnell's Roman Catholic Parliament of 1689, to dispossess every one associated, even in the remotest past, with the English connection. That would, at once, have led to civil war, in which Great Britain, even were she basely indifferent to the claims of her own in Ireland, and of those who stuck to her, would have been compelled, for the sake of her own existence, to have intervened in force, as she undoubtedly will have to do should such a state of things recur.

This matter has been dwelt upon, at length, because its importance in the future will, it is believed, be greater than it was in the past.

Napoleon's methods of peaceful penetration into other countries, as the first stage of war, which he applied to Ireland during the peace of Amiens, have already been referred to, when his military and revolutionary employees were described as agents of commerce. These methods did not end with him.

The system of studying the campaign decided upon, in the country doomed to be the theatre of the attack, was imitated, and improved on, with great success by Germany before the beginning of the wars of 1866 and 1870-71, and may be used in the future in Ireland, where, under Independent Home Rule, in the hands of a Nationalist party bent on separation, foreign agents could be more easily welcomed, and be more free to give active assistance in military training, arming, etc., than under the Union.

We have to remember, too, that, whereas in 1690 and 1798 the Irish internal communications were very few and imperfect, they are now excellent in the matter of roads and bridges; and the introduction of railways, tramways, telegraphs, etc., and wireless telegraphy with America and elsewhere, give the possessors vastly greater advantages than in the past.

The European terminus of wireless telegraphy is in the west of Ireland, and a Separatist Ireland could control, and tap, all wireless messages between ourselves and Canada; while it would be found very convenient by the Fenian wing established in Ireland for communicating with their base in the United States: a base that, in point of time, is now not very much further from Ireland than that of France was in the eighteenth century.

The Fenian Americans in the States could thus act as a central exchange for cypher messages between Ireland and European Continental nations, by using the telegraph back to Europe; so that the whole circuit would be independent of the control of Great Britain.

A British squadron, if occupied off Ireland to prevent invasion by an Irish ally, or the landing, by it, of arms and war material, would be shut out from any information or help it could rely on from Ireland itself. It would be more likely to be impeded and frustrated.

The Admiralty could not communicate with it by telegraph through Ireland, because such telegrams, if in clear, would become public property, and, if in cypher, would be stopped.

The squadron would be in a worse position than Admiral Kingsmill's squadron was in 1796-8 with a British base in Cork ; while, as regards the regular army, if forced to operate in Ireland, the telegraphs and railways, which would give such facilities to the Government in possession, would be denied to it.

Several other points must be mentioned. The Executive Government in the rebellion of 1794-8 had the control of the posts, which checked, if it did not prevent, the spread of seditious literature. So much so, that the French Directory ordered Count O'Shea not to communicate by post at all. Under an Irish Government, hostile to Britain, it would become a weapon in its hands, instead.

Again, the organisation of that admirable force the Irish Constabulary in the nineteenth century, under the Union, was, and is, a source of security.

If paid by, and in the hands of a Hiberno-American Separatist Government, it might be used as a recruiting agency, and a military training ground, where skilled foreign drill masters could practice their arts, with a view to making "Ireland a Nation"; and it would be necessary for Great Britain to increase the number of her regular troops

in Ireland, in order to counterbalance the Constabulary, when it had become the servant of the Home Rule Government.

This would impose an additional task on the only existing land force on which we can place any reliance, for home, for imperial, and for European necessities; while, except in Ulster, the unrepresented and inarticulate Loyalists in three fourths of Ireland would, even if they wished to do so, be coerced into not serving. Our recruiting resources would therefore be more and more confined to Great Britain, and to non-Irish sources there, outside the coercive influence of an independent Ireland, where, even at present, the Army and Police are boycotted and denounced.¹ Recruiting, therefore, would be reduced not increased.

On the other hand, if Great Britain were induced to retain and pay the Irish Constabulary, as loyal and courageous a body as ever existed, those of us who went about, particularly in the west of Ireland, between 1885 and 1890, can testify how the National League, as it was then found convenient to call the Land League, dominated, bullied, and coerced the Constabulary, who behaved admirably under attempts to tamper with them, by using the minatory intimidation of overwhelming numbers; and that was under the Union.

What it would be under the Hiberno-American syndicate to which the country is, we are told, to

¹ I hear from several centres that the boy scouts, who join in Ireland, are only allowed to do so, on giving a pledge that they will serve neither in the British Army or Navy, nor in the Police. Those who enforce this vow probably think that "*Fas est ab hoste doceri.*"

be handed over, can readily be imagined, and would make such a proposal a costly farce. Great Britain will not know, and in spite of guarantees that, like pie-crusts, are made to be broken, will have no power of finding out, what is going on behind the veil of a Government that is bent on separation—a separation that may not be attempted until we are in as bad a position, or worse, than we were in between 1782 and 1797; but which will be prepared for by getting hold of the country, and biding the time.

If in 1782 Grattan's Loyalist Parliament was coerced, by its 50,000 armed National Guards, to take the opportunity of obtaining legislative independence; why should not 250,000 of the Sinn-Fein or Clan-na-Gael youth, equally force a still more willing Separatist Government to demand absolute and complete separation from Great Britain, and so obtain it.¹

The arms difficulty no longer exists, as it did in the Fenian attempt in 1867, seeing that the Arms Act in Ireland has not, for years, been re-enacted, and arms for future use may now be coming in. In any case, however, under an independent Separatist Government, there would be no difficulty in arranging openly, say with Fenian friends in the United States, or, better still, with some friendly European power, with disused arms to sell cheap, to get as

¹ Mr. A. M. Sullivan, in "The Story of Ireland," describes, in his index, p. 621, the view of his party as to the intervention of Grattan's 50,000 Volunteers as follows: "How the Irish Volunteers achieved the legislative independence of Ireland; or how the moral force of a citizen army effected a peaceful, legal, and constitutional revolution."

many more as might be required—arms which might even be capable of firing the same ammunition as the new arms by which they had been replaced. A matter that, in certain contingencies, might be, in itself, a convenience.

The lesson of the *précis* of events can hardly be mistaken.¹ It is a continued series of interventions and invasions, to attack Great Britain through Ireland, by inciting the enemies of the greater island in the lesser.

Between 1579 and 1798 there were, in Ireland, four landings of armed force by Spain, and six from France reached the Irish coast, apart from attempts that failed, or were defeated at sea, including that of the papal army under Stuckley, and that of Hardy defeated by Admiral Warren.

This state of things pressed most cruelly on the Celtic Irish; but the massacres and sufferings of the Protestants were also very great.

As already stated, it had been recognised by Henry VIII. that an independent or semi-independent Ireland, under the influence of a Continental power, would be the ruin of England, and in 1796 the French Directory confirmed that view from the opposite side, as Mahan has done from the position of a naval spectator.

Under all these circumstances Pitt, and many of the most far-seeing statesmen of the time, had been driven to the conclusion that absolute legislative union of the two islands was the only way to save the recurrence of the miseries and dangers of the past. He proposed it, and the Home Rule Parlia-

ment was, naturally, unwilling to accept the idea ; which meant the extinction of its own ascendancy ; but the majority, in view of compensation for their "vested" interests, ultimately carried the measure ; and it was concurred in, in their own interest, by a great majority of the Roman Catholics.

The political lesson of this rebellion of 1798, and what preceded it, had thus been for long foreseen ; namely, that complete legislative union between the three kingdoms could alone secure immunity from foreign interference, and keep order between the factions, born of the strife of races, and of religions ; and, at the same time, guarantee to all men their legitimate rights of equal legal and religious freedom, and security for themselves and their property. This union was carried in 1800, with a view to secure for the Catholics, who had been the great sufferers in the secular strife of the past, complete religious, civil, and political equality, under conditions that would prevent their abuse ; conditions that it had not, before the Union, been found possible to create ; and which, without the Union, would certainly disappear.

CHAPTER V

WE must now consider briefly what followed the Union in the nineteenth century, with the preliminary remark that the Union, from the start, never got a fair trial. The defeated side, and their descendants in two continents, have never ceased to frustrate its action by every means in their power, and capital was made of the difficulties of so fundamental a change; but the results have been very great.

In the first place, it stopped the habit among the factions of resorting to war among themselves; while the complete possession of the military factors in the country proved a security against invasion, and, with one futile exception, from the preliminary operations of arming and drilling those who desired separation, and of furnishing them, beforehand, with the munitions of war.

Catholic Emancipation was, unfortunately, delayed till 1829, contrary to the wishes and endeavours of Pitt, and the many who desired it; but the aftermath of centuries of struggle had not then, and has not now, entirely subsided, in Ireland, among the descendants of the combatants; nor in Great Britain, where the task of Empire was impeded and often arrested in consequence of the struggle.

In 1843, an agitation for repeal of the Union was suppressed by law ; but it showed that the desire for civil and religious liberty, already very largely gratified, was the excuse for, not the cause of, that irreconcilable, and relatively small element in Ireland, and the United States, which, for their own ends, desire to be the independent masters of the country.

Then came the famine of 1845-7, when the population had increased from four and a half millions in 1781-1800, a little more than half that of England and Wales at the time, to eight millions at the time of the failure of the potato crop.

At that time Cobden's agitation for Free Trade was only carried by the gravity of the Irish famine, which could have been equally provided for by temporary financial arrangements. The consequence was, that Ireland, an agricultural country, has for half a century suffered from Free Trade. The misery of the victims of famine gave the remnant of the United Irishmen their chance to incite them to rebellion, when the French Revolution of 1848 occurred : a revolution of nationalities, and which spread through Europe ; and while less violent, was in a way more far-reaching than that of 1789, and produced effects in England as well as Ireland. There Smith O'Brien, and a few followers, made a harmless stir, that before the Union might have been serious.

The United States were from 1861 to 1865 threatened with disruption, owing to differences of interpretation of the Constitution as to Federal and State rights, about which Mr. Roosevelt, while I was

there, admitted, when speaking in the South, that there was much to be said for each view.

The North, with the true instinct of national greatness, rightly, I think, maintained the Union of the States: the only Union that their constitution permitted, or that the original thirteen independent States could be got to acquiesce in. Those of Irish race, now about one tenth of the population of the States, were, at that time, relatively more numerous, and took their share of fighting for the Union as manfully as the rest.

When the war was over, there were, among them, large numbers of officers and men who had learnt war in the field of realities; and at the end, many of these combined, under the American Head-Centre Williams, to invade Canada in May 1866, with a view to its annexation and to strike a blow at Britain. The conduct of the Federal Government was correct. They arrested Williams and other leaders, and the attempt was frustrated.¹

Later on, having fought for the Union in the States, they came over, financed from there, to deprive us of it in Britain. They arrived in Ireland for the peaceful penetration of the country in dribblets, as the Navy, under the Union, prevented the landing

¹ Mr. Washburn, in his "Recollections of a Minister to France, 1860-77," mentions, vol. ii. p. 106, that Clusaret, a French officer, and a naturalised American citizen, who had been Commander-in-Chief to the Commune in 1871, and afterwards dismissed and tried; gave evidence at his trial that he had quitted the American Fenians when he could no longer defend them, and that, though named their Commander-in-Chief, he had never taken up the command. He was generally supposed to have been concerned in the Fenian attack on Chester to obtain arms.

of shiploads, and consequently of large supplies of arms and munitions. We were then at peace.

They had the usual paper scheme of army organisation for its conquest, in which the officers had their Fenian commissions and grades. Their political organisation was a secret society called the Fenian Brotherhood, with concentric circles of diminishing authority round the Head-Centre, the executive and dictator in one.¹ It appealed to doctrinarians who liked to do constitution-making with the compasses, and also to the Celtic love of the mysterious. This invasion was a serious matter, for although no officer of distinction was among the number, the whole were war-trained soldiers capable of giving trouble.

They had also the great advantage of a common language ; and they did not differ, in appearance, from the Irish, many of whom were their relations or forebears. However, though there was much talk, they were not largely supported, and the Union Government suspended the Habeas Corpus Act ; and when the intention to rise on June 5, 1867, was known, the attempt was easily suppressed. Had this invasion of trained soldiers occurred in 1899-1902, when we had only some seventeen depleted military units at home, it might well have been dangerous.

Having failed in Ireland, the Fenian invaders tried their hand against England and Wales, which they fancied they could intimidate by impotent threats of blowing up the capital, and by murder and dynamite

¹ This autocrat is said to have borne the modest name of Stephens ; it had not even an " O " or " Mac " before it.

outrages; as their Hindoo disciples think, in their turn, that they will succeed in doing in India.¹

The Fenians misconceived the British character, at all events of that day; though, in fairness to them, it must be acknowledged that they were more successful with Mr. Gladstone, who, in 1869, disestablished the Irish Church with a view to conciliate Catholic Nationalist and Fenian sentiment. It failed to do so. The establishment did not, it is true, rest on a fundamental clause of the Union, but it was none the less a deliberate breach of faith with its members. The effect, not perhaps foreseen, was to draw together all the Protestant communities in Ireland for, if necessary, their mutual defence.

Its author, later on, admitted that it was the Fenian use of dynamite, their attack on a prison, and their murder of a policeman on duty, that set him thinking, with the result, apparently, that he thought to pacify them with the abandonment of the Irish Church: a type of policy that never, in history, failed to have any but one ending.

In 1870 a Home Rule agitation was started in Ireland, which the Prime Minister responded to by a Land Act, that was denounced as inadequate. Then in 1886 and 1893 Mr. Gladstone, whose gigantic intellect towered over that of all others, brought in two Home Rule Bills that were rejected by the country, after its author had admitted that it "passed the wit of man" and, in his case, of super-man, to find a solution for some of the problems connected with it that defeated him. The last great contribution to the welfare of Ireland was Mr. Wyndham's land legislation, which was only possible under the

¹ See Chirol's "Unrest in India," ch. xi. p. 145.

Union. It was most generous, in the interest of the tenants, and at a cost that would, on completion, amount to about £200,000,000, of which £70,000,000 has already been spent, while £40,000,000 more would be covered by the Act of 1892. This guarantees the majority of these tenants in the ownership of their holdings, and would do so for the rest—a result that Home Rule is bound to arrest for want of funds, and also, with the aim of making the remainder, tenants of that Government instead, in order to strengthen its hold upon them. This expenditure was only justifiable for strengthening the Union.

A Cabinet Minister now urges Unionists to become the accomplices of his party aims, by acquiescing in charging the remaining £100,000,000, and Irish old age pensions, to Great Britain. The Egyptians paid the Israelites to go. The Unionists should only do so if Ireland stays. Irish separatists ask for the impossible to get the possible: but this suggestion is impossible. If, which heaven forefend, disruption be, two years hence, forced on the Predominant Partner, Great Britain, as a second-rate Power, with reduced numbers and other resources for war, would have no means to meet the charge; and it is a cruel fraud to hold out such hopes to promote separation. The Minister's aim is to make it irrevocable.

CHAPTER VI

To return to the military question. It has been contended, on the hypothesis that England had, and will continue to have, complete command of the sea, that an independent or semi-independent Ireland could not obtain foreign intervention ; but the past history of Ireland shows, how often the Navy was in no position to give such security ; and as regards the future, except during the period 1809-10 to 1815, when we did blockade all the ports of Europe, and operate in the west Atlantic and elsewhere throughout the world, with some 1,100 war ships, it is doubtful that, in the fullest sense, we continued for long to have complete command of the sea, even though it was not questioned till lately. A century after 1809-10, our *relative* naval strength, as compared with that of other Naval Powers, was certainly not a tenth of what it was then ; and the total of the annual financial resources of all those other Naval Powers is now at least six times as great as ours. Consequently, the prospect of our retaining even our present position, a position inferior to that of a two-Power standard, is more than doubtful, and the hypothesis falls to the ground.

The case against the hypothesis is even stronger, for, in the protracted contests that preceded 1809-10,

we had learnt the art of war at sea, through incessant fighting, for very many years, and had, in consequence, discovered and developed those few priceless leaders, and those many capable subordinates, who directed the warlike qualities of the men, and who won for their country that astounding prestige we ended by possessing, and which a century may have dimmed, but has failed entirely to obliterate.

In winning this, we had, before the battle of Trafalgar, so mastered the other Navies that we were able to deny to them like opportunities of seamanship, as the writings of Desbrière so clearly show, and also of warlike experience.¹

Nowadays, with the exception of Japan, all Naval Powers, including our own, are alike wanting in that war experience, whereas, a century ago, we possessed it, and others did not.

Hence the basis of our great superiority of the past has to be remade once more in war, for we can no longer venture to count alone on what a century has left us of the prestige of that past, without the causes that gave that prestige its existence.

Nor is this all. In the last century, our Empire must have increased tenfold, and we now have at least 50,000 miles of unfrozen coasts, though, of

¹ Cf. Guillon, p. 81, para. 3, showing the English advantage in leadership in 1790. He also, in p. 77, shows how the French Navy suffered owing to the decision of the French Convention in 1791 to open the navy to all, instead of to a class, in the matter of officers; which did away with its discipline, under its old aristocratic corps of naval officers, a discipline which it never recovered during the great war. See also pp. 79, 81 and 83.

course, the strategic lines of communication have not, correspondingly, increased. While, therefore, our *comparative* naval strength is not one tenth of what it was a century ago, our naval requirements are sure to have become very considerably greater than they were at that date, and, with the completion of the Panama Canal in a few years' time, will be greater still.

Again, the Anglo-Saxon races, in Europe and America, alone of all the great nations who have to hold what they have got, have not adopted the principle of the "Nation in Arms," under which the whole population, adequately organised and trained on *one system*, is available for the service of the State, at a relatively small cost per head.¹

We have an excellent, though very small, voluntary regular army, in the hands of officers who understand war; an Army that, since the beginning of the eighteenth century, has almost yearly seen service, somewhere or other, until now; but there is now nothing whatever but its own reserve behind it, ready and fit to meet the sudden emergency of war on a large scale.

Meantime few realise that the Empire includes one fifth of the land and one fourth of the population of the world. From being a purely insular power in the beginning of last century, we now are the greatest continental power in the world, with land frontiers considerably longer than the circumference of the earth; and we are in contact, along

¹ In 1804, Pitt found it necessary to apply a form of compulsory service, to secure men for the reserve battalions of the regular Army; and our future numerical requirements, when opposed to "Nations in Arms," will be vastly greater than in 1804.

them, with a thousand millions of the subjects of all the great Continental nations except Austria, now starting seriously as a Naval Power ; and this, with a British Army about half as strong as that Roumania thoroughly trains and maintains at a cost of less than £2,000,000 a year.¹

Seeing, therefore, that we no longer have the sea supremacy of the past, and are comparatively much weaker in army strength than we were a century ago, it would seem nothing short of madness to deprive ourselves, with our relatively small population, and one destined to decrease with our coal supply, of the security the Union has been proved to give us, even if offered the "shadow of Supremacy for the substance of Control."

To do so would be to add greatly to our naval tasks in Irish waters, when our supremacy in a neighbouring sea, and in many others at the same time, may be gravely imperilled, and to put the separatist elements in Ireland into a position of greatly increased opportunity for placing Ireland at the disposal of our enemies as a stepping-stone for the invasion of Great Britain.

Such is our position to-day. In the period of 1807-15 it was our Navy against a non-naval world, and apart from that material superiority, moral force in war stands, according to Napoleon, to material force as three to one ; and our naval prestige at that time was such as has never, before or since, been known at sea.

At that time we could, while at war, send troops everywhere throughout the world. Now it seems

¹ Cf. "A Century of Empire," in the *Fortnightly Review* of June 1905.

to be the view of the Admiralty that, until they can obtain the command of the sea, no matter how long that may take, they cannot guarantee that the expeditionary force can venture to leave the country. They are the judges ; but what an ominous change ! for the fate of the Empire, or of Europe, or of both, may be decided while they are engaged in their task.

The country is unwilling to believe in, and to face, this grave change that, most unhappily for us, a century has imperceptibly brought about as regards our sea power, and is also content with an Army of which only a quite inadequate fraction is fitted for war ; but it is high time it should realise its weakness, before it consents to strike a fatal blow at the security that Britain still possesses in being a United Kingdom—a blow that would greatly lessen our numerical, financial, and national power, and would increase the great burden that our comparatively lessened naval and military resources would have to bear, should the Union be in any way weakened or abolished.

There is one aspect of the military question yet to be touched on ; namely, What is to be the physical force that is to give effect to the legislative acts of the Independent Irish Parliament ?

Is the Irish Government to have an Army of its own to do the necessary shooting if the Unionists do not submit ; or is the Government of Britain, or Great Britain—we have not yet been told which—to place its regular Army at their disposal to do the work for them ?

If the former, then, should its Army be victorious, and the Unionists have ceased to exist, these

Irish-American prætorians need only order their Parliament to legislate for "the severance of the last link" with Great Britain. The Hiberno-Fenian syndicate would, then, start with a base in the United States, and with offensive and defensive alliances in Europe, such as Ireland has sought before, to guarantee her permanent autonomy, and to enable her, in return, to let Ireland be a stepping-stone for the foreign invasion of Great Britain.

On the other hand, if Britain, divided or undivided, is to retain that duty, the British Army, ruled by the soul of discipline as its guiding force, can only obey, detestable as the task would be, quite apart from the danger of its members being, individually, tried for murder by Irish Nationalist juries, should there be any casualties among Nationalist onlookers.

There is a law in dealing with inert matter; namely, that when the limit of elasticity of any material is exceeded by the strain put upon it, that material is dead for all purposes of usefulness. That would be the result in the living organism of the Army, if forced to kill their fellow Protestants and fellow Unionists, whose only crime is that they will not be turned out of the Union into which their forefathers were induced to enter by the Government of Great Britain, under the most solemn promises that it would be permanent, and that none would be forced to leave it. If these things come to pass, the wreck of the Army will coincide with the ending of the British Cabinet that forced the task upon it.

The question is one element of the military danger of Home Rule; while that of the jurisdiction under which the British soldiers would act on the

spot, would raise a whole harvest of others, that must await the Bill.

In any case it was one so difficult in 1893, that, even at a time when discussion in the House of Commons had not ceased to exist, no one, at the end, knew what was intended. Mr. Gladstone was not so crude as to tell them to "wait and see"; but he assured them that the union of hearts would make the contingency impossible. The contingency was disposed of by the community.

Now that legislators in the House of Commons use speech, not to illuminate, but to conceal their legislative intentions, and then guillotine the Opposition, to silence the exposure of their aims, we can only look to the House of Lords, when Home Rule comes before it, to imitate the recent splendid example of the French Senate, in probing to the bottom the action of those who, they considered, had, lately, aimed at undermining the greatness and security of France. Let them apply a like method to this question, and to all others, involved in the coming Bill, in order to educate the country in what is proposed.

The Union was passed to give *equality to all*. It did so, and we are ordered to end it.

Later on, the Transvaal republic came, as the Transvaal state, into union with Britain in South Africa. We destroyed their enemies the Zulus, and restored its credit. Then, under a Government indifferent to union, it invaded Natal and was let go out; and with what results!



CHAPTER VII

THE discussion on Home Rule has purposely been confined, so far, to Home Rule in Ireland ; for that is the supreme danger of the present ; but Irish Home Rulers have opened the question of Home Rule all round ; perhaps with a view to divide and distract opinion in Great Britain, and to secure there a return to the Heptarchy, or what preceded it.

That is a policy which, even had a great majority in Britain desired it, should have been treated and discussed as a whole, without show of favour or affection to a fraction, as has been done.

The course taken was, however, due to the fact that there was a separatist party in the market willing to be bought, and a Government in straits, and therefore willing to buy. In this case, each party bought the other, and together they fixed the bargain, namely the wreck of the Constitution and the dismemberment of Britain—a bargain both are pledged to force down the throats of the community.

As to Federation, the general tendency of States is, in course of time, to centralise the Government, with a view to national strength, more particularly in war. This is the present position of most of the European powers ; and notably of Britain, France, Italy, and Russia, and also of Japan.

The United States of America are federated, because, as already stated, they were debarred from concentration; but the Federal Government, which feels its national weakness, as does that of Australia, tends to concentration more and more; particularly as regards international affairs.

Germany likewise had to accept Federation of necessity, and is correspondingly the weaker; but the Reichstag does not govern, and Government and war are in the Emperor's hands. It is a federated autocracy, in the hands of a Dictator. The country also is of one race and one language: all three facts that balance in a measure its constitutional weakness; but the end is not yet.

Austria is now a country of many races, and many languages; and is peculiarly open to the centrifugal forces that are specially dangerous in Federated Governments, as the United States found to their cost in the sixties of last century.

The organiser of Home Rule, "that subtle Italian posing under the guise of a Scotsman," tried, a quarter of a century ago, to lure us, by charming visions of a union of hearts at home; and pointed triumphantly to Austria-Hungary, as a splendid example of Federation; at present it is much less so. His *pièce de résistance*, however, was the union of hearts in the United Kingdom of Sweden and Norway. Alas for his predictions, the hearts "are still there but the union has gone!" He has not left a single example for his present successors to quote in their favour.

Why, when the weaker type is always striving to become the stronger, should we, in these small islands, set to work to drift down from the stronger

to the weaker one; and one that, by the law of its being, tends to disruption, particularly at times of national weakness or difficulty, as the teachings of many centuries of Irish history have stamped on our memories.

As to the question of equal treatment for all under Home Rule, the leader of the Irish parliamentary party, when under the star-spangled banner and addressing his paymasters, exhibits all "the rage of the vulture" for the dismemberment of his prey. While in Great Britain he coos with "the love of the turtle" so sweetly, that all may see it is his passionate love for our common empire, and his wish to strengthen it, that makes him desire to fortify it by disunion at the heart.

That explains his anxiety to save us expense in Ireland, by a quite trifling delegation of authority to himself; while, as others have done before, he promises us absolute equality of treatment, and consequent union of hearts, all based on unlimited guarantees vouched for on his sole authority, as the dictator of the Parliament of Britain—guarantees which, if spread over all the unborn paper in the forests of Canada, would be of less value than a pennyworth of the ink wasted in doing so.

Those who break up the constitution of their country, are bankrupts in the matter of constitutional guarantees.

Both he and Mr. Patrick Ford have a common aim, namely "delenda est Carthago," and both say so in America. Mr. Ford is seldom heard here, but, to do him justice, he is quite straightforward, and sticks to his text, as he does to his dynamite.

We have had an object-lesson since 1898, when

we saw the application, sound in principle, of local self-government of the type in Great Britain, to Ireland as well, with the unquestionable result that, wherever a Nationalist majority exists, as it does through the bulk of the country except in Ulster, the Protestant minority is, as far as possible, excluded from its legitimate influence in local affairs.

In 1898, when the County Councils took over the officials of the Grand Juries, there was a semblance of impartiality in retaining Protestants or others opposed to Nationalist ulterior aims—it had, however, an economic cause, for it saved the cost of compensation for disturbance, which the Act enforced—but as these drop out they are replaced by Nationalists.

Indeed, it has been recently stated by Lord Lansdowne that out of 666 County Councillors in Ireland, outside Ulster, only eighteen, or less than 3 per cent., are Protestants, and of the eighteen, most, for all we know, may be Nationalists.

The broad outcome of this is, that in three quarters of Ireland, Protestants, except a few who are Nationalists as well, are shut out of the most influential offices; and, what is quite as objectionable, is, that loyal Catholics of property and others, who do not declare for the Nationalists' programme of separation, are equally excluded.

From the Protestant and Unionist point of view, "*Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.*"

In three provinces of the four, therefore, it is clear the Nationalist caucus has excluded practically all who disagree with their disruptive tendencies, and local self-government is confined to their creatures.

They excuse this action on the ground that Belfast

is intolerant. With such an example, this, if true, would be regrettable, though not surprising; but the situation disposes, once for all, of the theory of "the union of hearts," which, instead of coming, has actually gone: done to death by the Nationalist resolution "to let in none but their own." "If they do these things in the green tree" of local self-government, "what shall be done in the dry" of complete independence from British control, under a Separatist Ascendancy party, opposed alike to Unionism, to Protestantism, and to property; and directed, largely, by Irish-American anarchists, who, as the paymasters of the Hiberno-Fenian syndicate in which they have risked their money, must, in common decency, be appointed as the Dollar Directors, if they are to make it pay?

The Irish parliamentary leader speaks as if he had got an absolutely united Ireland in his pocket, to dispose of as he wills, and on his own terms.

Apart from the religious, and racial, questions which deeply divide Ireland, he ignores the great body of people who are determined to maintain the Union as the only guarantee of equality of treatment, and of imperial security.

The great body of those who have property of any kind in Ireland, which they foresee would be attacked under Home Rule—those, for instance, who, owing to the arrest of the Wyndham Acts, will be in the position of landlords prepared to sell, but unable to do so; or others desirous not to sell—in both cases know, from the teachings of history, what their fate would be.

Then there are others, such as the new peasant proprietors, who know that under the anarchy of

Home Rule, the landless men will rob them of what they have so long struggled to obtain.

Others again, such as the owners of railway stocks and shares, who must know quite well that their property will be nationalised, over their heads, at a small price, if any, and without appeal.

Then again there is the dread in the minds of the Catholic clergy, that the new emergence of Socialism in some of the secret societies, bodes ill for their religion, and for their patronage of appointing the National School teachers; and that it will lead the attack on their unique position as regards the control of education, in the direction of the "école Laïque." Nor will the disestablished Church of Ireland escape a fresh spoliation; justified on the ground that Mr. Gladstone's Act was only a "first instalment."

Besides all these, there is the large body of placemen who must, on economic grounds, disappear under Home Rule; and will look in vain to it for compensation.

Lastly, there is the vast body of members of secret societies, representing physical force; rendering no allegiance to the parliamentary leader, and bent on separation in their own short way, and not by his more tortuous methods.

At present it is no longer a question of the Irish parliamentary leader governing Ireland through the United Irish League, which is already undermined by other leagues more bent, if that be possible, than it is on absolute separation, to which they all have definitely committed themselves. Leagues such as the "Clan-na-Gael"; "the Sinn Fein, the Irish Fenian Brotherhood"; the Irish branch of the

American Society of the "Ancient Order of Hibernians"; and others less in evidence for the moment, but only needing the hot-bed of Home Rule to force them up, to join the strife.

These leagues are generally Roman Catholic by selection: some of them anarchist by predilection; and all rapidly becoming affiliated with the kindred orders in America.

They are manned by the younger men, as ignorant of constructive politics as were the Communists of 1871; and who are going all lengths, and the task is difficult, to outbid the United Irish League, and to oust it from its place.

We have seen already, in the history of Celtic movements, that violence, invariably, masters the movement; and of violence, among these, there is a plethora. It is their time that is coming, if Home Rule be carried, and not that of the parliamentary party, or of the peace-loving majority.

Let us now turn to the predominant partners—the American Fenian Directors who pay the bill.

It is not generally known that, between 1860 and 1870, the Central Commune of the "Internationale," desiring to embrace all mankind in its tentacles, sent orders to its agents in India and China, to incite the communities there to adopt its methods of anarchic internationalism, and to urge them to form Communes, and to combine to oust the existing order of things.

The results have been for some time apparent in India, and are more generally apparent to-day in China, and even in Japan, as well.

Quite lately, Sir Valentine Chirol, in chapter xi. of his "Unrest in India," has pointed out, at length,

how the Fenian wing of the "Internationale" in America seized an opportunity of helping that cause, and their own, in India, when the Hindoo agitators sent over parties to study anarchy and dynamite in the United States.

The Fenians promptly took these aspirants in hand, looked after their education in both branches, and wrote suitable seditious literature for them to circulate in India. This was translated into Hindee, printed in that language in New York, and, in due course, transmitted in bulk to India. It is believed they sent other things besides.

They also, it is said, prepared and printed a literature, likewise in Hindee, suitable for retransmission to England, and retranslation for consumption in the House of Commons, where they knew they could count on the obedience and ability of their Separatist, and other, agents there, to make excellent use of it.

Nor have Fenian activities ceased there. They lately opposed the arbitration treaty between Britain and the United States; and for this purpose, and perhaps for others, they tried to effect a German-Fenian alliance with the six millions of Teutons peaceably settled in the Great Republic, and who, it is stated, joined them in protesting against the treaty.

It is into this whirlpool of hostile forces we are called upon to thrust our fellow Protestants and other fellow Unionists, to sink or swim as best they can, in order to buy off the undying hostility of a number of conspirators in Ireland, and the United States, who direct us to do so, at our peril, in order to enable them to wreck the Empire against which

they have, for long, directed their attacks all the world over.

It is difficult to find, in history, a case where a paramount Power, unhampered by defeat in war or grave difficulties at home, has, voluntarily, driven out subjects who neither asked for, nor desired, to be sent adrift in the midst of their enemies; but the British system, so lacking in a fixed and uniform policy, under party government, furnishes at least one example which has been recorded by my old friend, Sir Godfrey Lagden.¹

In the first half of the last century H.M. Government, as a paramount Power, had concerned itself with the Basutos and other South African natives, and also with the Whites, in what became the Orange River Territory. In 1848 it proclaimed the sovereignty of the Queen over that territory, and the government of it was organised in 1851.

Troublous times succeeded, and on January 30, 1854, an Order in Council recited the history of the transaction, and was followed by a proclamation, signed by Lord Grenville, abandoning the sovereignty of the Crown over the aforesaid territory.

So Britain, to use Sir Godfrey's words, "crept out of a sovereignty," that neither the Whites nor the gallant Basutos desired to leave.

It was a lamentable example of racial weariness and of governmental impotence, and a cruel abandonment of those manly *vortreckers*, Dutch and English, who stood, like rocks, amidst the stormy sea of black barbarism.

True we had failed to establish the "Pax Britannica," and, in the lawlessness of the time and

¹ Cf. Sir Godfrey Lagden's book, "The Basutos," pp. 176-9.

the absence of government, they acted often, as our border forefathers did, in like circumstances, on both banks of the Tweed, still they were not men that an imperial race did well to thrust out.

Hence, in the Boer War of 1881, it was not surprising that the neutrality of the Orange Free State was in marked sympathy with the Transvaal, when the latter invaded Natal territory; and that on February 28, 1881, the writer saw, from the Amajuba, a commando of 300 of the sons of those we had abandoned in the wilderness. These had also invaded, and *laagered* on Natal territory, and, on that day, fought beside the large force with which the Transvaal Boers enveloped us. It was the nemesis of history, the lessons of which our race seems doomed unceasingly to forget. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is a master of prestidigitation, in the squaring of deputations; but, in the case of Irish Unionists, he and others will find that these Unionists, rightly, feel the matter is too serious for the diplomacy of blarney, of which they have had enough and to spare in the cradle of that art in which he is but an amateur.

The end of the matter is that no great nation has ever, willingly, committed "the happy dispatch"; and why should Britain, under the coercion of Irish separatists and of Fenian anarchists, the latter a small fraction of the subjects of a foreign power, and who receive no sympathy from the great nation under whose shelter they operate?

Men who, for the last thirty years, have sympathised with, and cheered every enemy of Britain; and who in the last Boer War organised and sent out several Fenian-American, so-called, brigades,

and the Clan-na-Gael Guards of Chicago, to take sides with our enemies in South Africa.¹

These came into being, it is true, chiefly to furnish copy for the Fenian press of Chicago: advertisement, not fighting was their rôle, and they were practically harmless; but the act stamps their undying hostility, which one of the fraternity has defined as follows: namely, "There should be no room in Ireland for a Unionist Irishman or a Unionist Irishwoman."

Nor was this the first instance in which separatists opposed us in South Africa. To my own knowledge, in the Boer War of 1881, one, at least, of their agents, who had lived and been entertained in our camp at Mount Prospect, afterwards transferred himself, and the information he had collected, to the Boers at Lang's Neck.

Britain is, forsooth, to recoup these, its would-be conquerors, in three continents, not their own, for having obliged them to wait for a British Cabinet, base enough to buy them, and the party they subsidise in Ireland, at their own price; in order to accomplish the disruption of the Constitution which stood in its way.

Even the meek victims of Japanese self-immolation are not called upon, as is proposed in our case, to pay a huge ransom beforehand, and to pledge their posterity to go on paying it for ever; all for

¹ Cf. Mr. Michael Davitt's book, "The Boer Fight for Freedom." I am told by an officer who did good service in the last Boer War, that the Clan-na-Gael Guards of Chicago did not materialise in battle on that occasion. I can quite believe it; their natural environment was the atmosphere of political agitation against our Empire everywhere.

the sole privilege of disembowelling themselves. The British, of these days, are a singularly meek people ; are they to prove even meeker still than some in Japan ?

Our present danger is that, while men dream of the security their forefathers bought with their blood, as bound to last for ever, without any national effort in their own persons, the ship of State, struck, perhaps, by some sudden and treacherous cyclone, like that which struck Austria from Prussia in 1866, may fail to outride the storm, and, foundering, may sink to rise no more. Why clear the path of the coming cyclone, by yielding to a conspiracy that seeks our ending, and aims at working with and utilising the results of that cyclone, as a means of destroying both Britain and her Empire. No ; the heart of the Empire must be kept whole-hearted.

NOTE.—At the risk of appearing to have repeated myself, I have, with the kind permission of the editor of the *Morning Post*, appended a letter on the subject, written in 1910 on the military effects of Home Rule in Ireland, at a time when the question was just hinted at, so as to claim a mandate at the forthcoming election, but without a hint as to what change was contemplated, or when. A very " slim " procedure in the manœuvre for position !

THE MILITARY EFFECTS OF HOME RULE IN IRELAND

[REPRINTED BY PERMISSION OF THE EDITOR OF THE
" MORNING POST "]

SIR,—Whatever be the form of Home Rule Mr. Asquith may bring forward, should his Government

return to power, the ultimate goal of the *facilis descensus* he is preparing for his country must inevitably end in Separation or the reconquest of Ireland. Separation would leave Ireland free to make military alliances with any Power that designed our destruction; and to place Ireland at its disposal as a basis for attack on Great Britain.

Mr. Redmond, who, unlike his greater predecessor, only leads one of several factions, and the least outspoken of them, has left no doubt on that point, any more than did Mr. Parnell in his speech of November 5, 1885, when he claimed the right "to make our land a nation" and "free from outside control." Speaking to his American paymasters in the United States on November 13, 1901, Mr. Redmond said: "Our ultimate goal is the national independence of our country"; and again at Kanturk on November 17, 1895, his words were: "The consummation of all our hopes and aspirations is, in one word, to drive English rule, sooner or later, bag and baggage, from our country!"

We have had ample warning from both of them, and from others like "Major" McBride, whose violent Separatist and pro-German speech of last month is referred to in the *Times* under the heading "Ireland and the German Invasion." Such indications of how the wind blows cannot be ignored, seeing that only last March the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary warned the country, in language of gravity such as none of us have heard before in Parliament, that our naval supremacy was gravely imperilled by the naval preparations of the most powerful military State in the world, and one of our nearest neighbours.

Let us consider what the giving of semi-independence to Ireland means to us. At present, under the Union, and with a strong Government, Ireland from the military point of view causes no strain. During the late Boer War, though our

Regular Forces at home were reduced to some 17,000, more than half of them untrained, no military difficulty arose in Ireland, because we were masters of the military factors in the country—the communications of all sorts, the import of arms, the harbours, the shipbuilding yards, and the food supplies—while a loyal constabulary kept us in touch with any movements tending to rebellion. At that time the world was still obsessed by the tradition of our naval supremacy. The myth has now lost its power, and our naval superiority over a single Power is itself at stake, while our trained, and only reliable, force at home on land is totally inadequate for our enormous needs. For these reasons the danger of handing over “the military plant for an armed revolution” to be used to secure Separation is infinitely greater than it was in Mr. Gladstone’s days.

The dominant faction in Ireland will, under semi-independence, have the military resources of Ireland in their hands to use, or to destroy, should we attempt to employ them, as well as the control of a coast-line of 2,500 miles. Every telegram to or from Canada will pass through their hands, or may be tapped by them and reported to Foreign Powers. They can utilise their constabulary, with the willing assistance of the best drill-masters in Europe, as a training ground for the “army of revenge”; and although, as the Transvaal was, they may be legally debarred from the treaty-making power, they could, as has occurred elsewhere, come to secret arrangements with those who aim at our ending, by accepting their guarantee of independence, in exchange for the use of Ireland to forward those aims.

We have to recollect that at the critical time of the Kruger telegram, the Government of a friendly Power did all it could to get Portugal to consent to let them disembark and march their armed forces

into the Transvaal, on the plea of protecting their nationals who were never in the slightest danger, and in defiance of the King's Suzerainty. In the case of Ireland the necessary "nationals" might be already there in strength, while there would, this time, be no Portugal to say "No." Disloyal Ireland would become the focus of intrigue with hostile Powers, and with the paymasters in the States; with all of whom her action might constantly embroil us.

Semi-independence, while it lasts, will place us in the position of a Federal State, which Austria-Hungary and the United States find so enfeebling, compared to United Governments like our own and those of France, Russia, and Japan. It will reduce the money contributions of Ireland, and will therefore reduce the sinews of war in Great Britain, already so inadequate. The Customs will be the only Irish financial assistance for Imperial ends. They can be boycotted, and the more popular and cheaper method of smuggling would soon diminish the "English tribute." This would also throw an extra strain on our already overtaxed Navy, and one that would be ineffective with so long a coastline. For the guarding of a coast in unfriendly hands on shore is a very different task from what it is with the country and the telegraphs in our own hands. Next we may have the repudiation of the income from the £180,000,000 or so we are now expending to create peasant proprietors, who might be encouraged, or even forced by an Irish Government to refuse to pay their debts, and impose on us a further loss of capital for war.

Home Rulers tell us, as usual, that "the union of hearts," after five centuries, will render all these things impossible, or that Great Britain is so powerful she would only have to insist on such things ceasing under the threat of resuming possession. On the other hand, we have here party assurances

that every concession will be "subject to the supreme authority of the Imperial Parliament." That sounds awe-inspiring, but, as a security, it depends on compelling force behind. Have we got it? What did such verbiage avail us in the Transvaal in the absence of such force? No, Mr. Asquith wants the country to accept the shadow of supremacy for the substance of control at a moment of grave national danger. In the first place we should have no right to ask another Government, or have means of finding out, what was going on; and we should be ignorant of most matters; just as we are ignorant now, even in Great Britain itself, of much that goes on under our very noses; but, even if we realised our danger, as we stand at present, we have not, in these islands, more than 150,000 trained regulars of fighting age, most of them reservists in civil life, on whom alone we can, for a moment, rely to resist invasion in Britain. For this their numbers are quite inadequate, apart from any other task. We cannot, therefore, under the threat of invasion, detach a single trained soldier to assist France and to maintain the balance of power in Europe, or to protect India and our Colonies against attack from within or without, or to take hostile action against enemies and their Colonies: while our main fleets are tied to the North Sea, and we have largely to abandon the command of the sea that we, till lately, supposed ourselves to possess.

Under the Union we can control the rebellious in Ireland with hardly an effort, even during war. Before the Union, when the country was in the hands of the Protestant ascendancy party, substantially loyalist, and when the French landed a trifling force at Killala, we had, to make sure of early success, to turn out about 100,000 men, partly owing to the imperfection of military communications, which are now excellent, but which, in the

case in point, would be in the hands of our enemies, whose "dynamite brigades" could destroy them and so deny them to ourselves.

Does any one suppose that with American and European assistance and backing in Ireland; with the Arms Act done away with by the present Government, and with the military plant of the country in Separatist hands, we could undertake the re-occupation of Ireland with less than the whole of our trained military force in Britain already referred to, if, indeed, 150,000 would suffice! Were we to enter on that campaign we should completely disarm Great Britain in the face of foreign invasion; a contingency which the Defence Committee of the Cabinet has now at last recognised as possible, though, for the moment, it has limited the invaders to 70,000. Judging, however, by the steady rise in the estimates of the numbers that may come, since the "not a dinghy" theory was put forward, the 70,000 may next year rise officially to 150,000 or 200,000.

The people of these islands, are, as a rule, assured they are safe by their political pastors, with whom party aims are everything. With all the confidence of ignorance, they are averse to the effective national effort on land that all other races have adopted, to render invasion impossible, and there seems little present prospect of our being in a stronger position than our very dubious one of to-day. It is evident, therefore, that, given Home Rule, separation, not reconquest, is the certain end; and that, in parting with the military control of Ireland, the House of Commons may, as far as it lies with them, be sealing the doom of the British race and the British Empire.

Our safety, however, is not alone at stake. In war, military prestige and unbroken good faith are among the most important of the moral factors. Before the Union the ascendancy party, chiefly Protestant, had had military control of Ireland and

of all her resources. When Pitt, in the interest of all, proposed the Union, and invited that party to lay down their ascendancy, and accept "equality for all," they did so on the most solemn promises that their religion, liberty, property, and every other right they possessed should be forever safeguarded by Great Britain, not only for themselves, but their descendants.

None can fail to respect the fidelity of Catholics to their faith, but Mr. Asquith invites the electorate to return his party to power, to enable it, among other things, to set up a Politico-Catholic and Separatist ascendancy, in place of the one for which the Union was substituted by Pitt, and thereby to reverse in Ireland the defeat of the Continental counter-reformation that culminated at the Boyne, and that aimed at destroying the civil and religious liberties we, happily, continue to enjoy.

This new ascendancy would be composed of the enemies of every loyalist element in Ireland and throughout the Empire, and to their tender mercies he proposes to relegate the sons of those who bowed to the statesmanship of Pitt, in reliance on the pledged faith of Great Britain that the Union was to be forever. It seems impossible to suppose that the British will descend to such an infamy of faithlessness, unless they really are a people who are dead to honour and careless of national existence. If they be, the faith that once was the glory of our race will rank in history with that of Carthage.

For whom are we going to commit this suicide of insanity and blot ourselves out of the book of nations? The population of Ireland, at one time nearly half that of Great Britain, is now under four millions, as against more than forty millions on this side of the water. Of the four millions the loyalist one-third detest Home Rule as ardently as the Separatists desire it, because the former know the fate that would await them under that rule.

Again, owing to the new emergence of factions, that only the hand of Mr. Parnell could keep under, the immediate following of the parliamentary party must now be less, perhaps much less, than two millions, and the other factions would instantly repudiate any parliamentary engagements Mr. Redmond might find it opportune to hint at. At the dictation of this Parliamentary minority, two millions to forty-two millions, it is proposed to risk the ending of our race and of the Empire.

Mr. Lloyd George says that "minorities must suffer," except this particular one; a minority he considers more important than the whole. And what is this minority whose pleasure it is we should commit the "happy despatch," and bring everlasting infamy on British faith?

They are the followers of an Irish-American political syndicate, financed by their countrymen in the States. They are the successors of those whom the greatest of Liberal statesmen declared to be "steeped to the lips in treason," and who would "march through rapine to the dismemberment of the Empire." They profess to be the friends of all the enemies of our country.

If the electorate ponder these things and see where they are being led, they will remember that *salus reipublici* is the *Summa lex*, and will hesitate to give a mandate to secure the ascendancy of such a party, at the risk that the British may, in the words of Sir Edward Grey, become "the conscript appendage" of a conquering race.¹

T. FRASER.

83, ONSLOW SQUARE.

¹ In the above letter, before the last Census, I estimated the population of Ireland as under 4,000,000, on the basis of the Census rates of previous decreases. The last Census made it 4,382,000, and that of Britain 45,216,800. The Naval aspect, under the heading "What is Supremacy at Sea?" was dealt with in the *Morning Post* on January 8, 1910.

IRELAND







100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Statute Miles.
 160 0 100 200 300 400 500 Nautical Miles.

1:13,500,000



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
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